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## WASHINGTON POST

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

## Criticism of CIA Exposure Rejected

By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

Spiro Agnew resurfaced the other day to warn against revoking the Central Intelligence Agency's writ to assassinate foreign VIPs. He doesn't want high level murder to get out of hand, mind you, but regards it as "an extreme option that we should keep."

At the same time, members of Congress, administration spokesmen and even some editorialists have denounced congressional committees for publicizing the CIA's homicidal intrigues. There are signs that the committees are backing off and pulling their punches.

Some of the critics oppose washing our blood-stained linen in public because it hinders intelligence gathering, complicates our relations with touchy nations whose leaders may have been on our hit list and alienates people around the world who might look askance upon government gangsterism.

Others contend that the CIA must operate at the same subterranean level as the KGB: that we must confront the Communists in the netherworld as well as the visible world; that we must give our officials secret authority to play the dirty game, trusting them to do the right thing.

The trouble with such sentiments is that they are un-American. Literally. They simply cannot be squared with four fundamental assumptions upon which the American system was constructed:

(1) Officialdom, left to itself, will tend to do wrong not right; (2) powers not rigidly limited and regularly inspected will be used against our people as well as others; (3) secret, unaccountable powers must be forbidden to government, particularly the power to commit crimes; and (4) should one branch usurp such powers, the others are duty bound to expose and restrain it.

Is it possible that, only 16 months after the Watergate climax, these homely truisms must be relearned? If so, there is need to review how the CIA got into the assassination business.

Who, for instance, gave the CIA authority to commit murder? In this land, the people are the sovereigns, and the government cannot assume powers that the people do not bestow. Any agency that operates beyond its authority, therefore, is acting illegally.

The assassination plots, like Adolf Hitler's death ovens, were carefully hidden from the people. If the Senate intelligence committee could not identify who had authorized the killing of undesirable potentates, the committee at least traced how the ugly secret finally leaked out.

We played the key role in this unraveling, which began almost nine years ago. On March 7, 1967, we reported a 1963 CIA plot to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. "Our sources agree," we wrote, "that a plot against Castro definitely was taken up inside the CIA at the time Senator Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., was riding herd on the agency for his brother."

This was the first that President Johnson had heard about it. Our story, according to the committee, "prompted Johnson to direct (CIA chief Richard) Helms to conduct an investigation."

As we poked deeper into the dark recesses of the CIA, meanwhile, we contacted John McCone, who had headed the CIA during the assassination attempts. In great alarm, he called Robert Kennedy, who asked him to set down his recollections in memo form. McCone dictated the memo on April 14, 1967.

Relates the committee: "The memorandum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist Jack Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination attempts. After talking with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dictated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated . . . 'I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro.'"

Helms, meanwhile, assigned the CIA inspector general to conduct the investigation Johnson had requested. The subsequent report, dated May 23, 1967, confirmed a series of CIA assassination involvements.

But Helms deceived Johnson, the committee says, by giving him an abridged oral report on the earlier attempts to kill Castro, without mentioning that these efforts had continued into the Johnson presidency.

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# Two Say McNamara Urged Castro Assassination

By JOHN HALL  
News American Bureau

WASHINGTON — At least two participants in a high-level Aug. 10, 1962, meeting on Cuba have testified that then Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara said Fidel Castro should be assassinated.

A third gave a similar account but later recanted. A fourth said he couldn't recall but, after checking his records, said McNamara made the suggestion.

Three others said they couldn't recall the subject of killing the Cuban leader being raised at all.

McNamara, now president of the World Bank, said he had no recollection of saying such a thing and "It is entirely out of character with what I believe I thought at the time . . ."

An aide to former CIA Director John McCone said he listened in on a phone conversation the next day in which McCone scolded McNamara for having made the suggestion.

Another CIA official submitted a memorandum he said he dictated four days after the meeting which said McNamara brought up the assassination suggestion.

Despite the conflicting testimony, dimmed memories and incomplete records, the

material assembled by the Senate Intelligence Committee on the Aug. 10 meeting of 16 members of the interdepartmental mongoose special group represents the firmest evidence to date that the assassination of Castro was a subject not confined entirely within the walls of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

CIA officials involved in the assassination plot have testified they were operating under tremendous pressure from the White House and from Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy to rid the Western Hemisphere of the Castro regime. There was direct authority from president

John F. Kennedy to encourage sabotage and to produce a violent military overthrow of Castro.

There was no specific injunction from the White House and overseers of the CIA prohibiting CIA involvement in assassinations. And the committee said there is a strong likelihood that the lack of clear command authority for an assassination was part of the "plausible denial" doctrine, in which the president and his top staff could tell the world without fear of contradiction that they were not involved should the plot be exposed.

But Sen. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., Aid the Aug. 10,

1962 meeting "is one of the few times where the committee has established upon convincing evidence, that assassination was raised and overtly discussed as a possible course of action."

Baker said he found it "disturbing" that the exhaustive inquiry did not establish who suggested assassination.

"No one was candid enough to say, 'Yes, I raised it, but not in a serious vein or in a moment of frustration,' rather we are left either to question the credibility of the witness or conclude that assassination was so commonplace or insignificant that it did not make an impression on anyone. In any case, it is not a pleasant picture."

William Harvey and Gen. Edward Lansdale, who were running the CIA's anti-Castro effort, testified that McNamara raised the assassination possibility.

Lansdale said he could not recall exactly but McNamara "was usually very brief and terse in his remarks and it might have been something like, well, look into that . . ."

Harvey said he was "not guessing . . . to the best of my recollection, it was surfaced by Robert McNamara." Harvey's Aug. 14 memorandum on the meeting also referred to McNamara

bringing up the assassination suggestion.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presidential advisers McGeorge Bundy and Roswell Gilpatric said they could not recall having heard anyone discuss assassination at the meeting.

But Richard Goodwin, another presidential adviser, told the committee staff that "etched on his memory" was the following: "McNamara got up to leave during a discussion of how to get rid of Castro and said the only way to get rid of Castro was to kill him." Goodwin said McNamara added, "I really mean it."

Later, however, Goodwin testified before the committee he was "unable to say with certainty" who brought up the subject.

Thomas Parrot, who recorded minutes for the meeting, said he did not recall McNamara raising assassination, and the minutes do not reflect that it was discussed at all.

### Former CIA head wants intelligence committee

Hot Springs, Virginia

Former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John A. McCone, is advocating the establishment of a single joint committee on intelligence within Congress to oversee the activities of the CIA.

Mr. McCone told a meeting of the Business Council, an organization of the top executives of 100 of the largest United States corporations, that the recent revelations about the agency have so greatly damaged the image of the CIA that some changes must be made to end criticism and restore confidence while at the same time enabling the CIA to continue to collect foreign intelligence.

11 October 1975

# McCone Urges Tighter Rein on CIA

HOT SPRINGS, Va. (UPI) — Former CIA director John A. McCone said yesterday the intelligence agency needs closer White House and congressional supervision even though reports of its misdeeds have been exaggerated.

But he said CIA operations must still be wrapped in a "cloak of secrecy" for the protection of agents and because the intelligence mission is vital to national defense.

McCone, CIA director from 1961 to 1965 in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, spoke to reporters at a meeting of The Business Council, an association of top industrial executives which he addressed in closed session.

He recommended that the President's National Security Council be put in direct charge of the CIA and that Congress also create a joint committee to assist in overseeing the agency.

BUT HE SAID the over-

sight, and intelligence secrets the CIA develops, should be restricted to a tight circle composed of the President, his chief national security adviser — currently Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — and a few members of Congress.

"The proximity of the CIA and its director to the President and the National Security Council should be made more conspicuous," McCone said.

He conceded the CIA had abused the law and its own charter in a variety of ways made public recently by a presidential commission and congressional committees.

But he said these abuses had been minor ones and the adverse publicity they generated had obscured the responsible and valuable services performed by the agency.

AMONG ITS violations, McCone said, the CIA had carried out surveillance of Americans and the illegal opening of mail long after those activities had ceased to serve a legitimate intelligence purpose.

"It was a natural outgrowth of a program to determine if there were foreign influences or financing of some of these dissident

groups" during the years of protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he said.

McCone said he had expressed his views on CIA oversight to administration officials and had met privately on Thursday with Sen. Frank Church D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate committee investigating CIA activities.

Asked whether the administration had made plans for closer CIA supervision, McCone said officials told him they were waiting to see what developed from the Church committee's investigations.

# New Need in U.S. — Truth in Politics

By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

It has become part of our political folkways for candidates to spout hokum. For some, lying becomes a habit they cannot break after they are elected to office.

This may explain why so many politicians are willing to place the full weight of the U.S. government behind flagrant falsehoods. At all levels of government, officials play loose with the truth to cover up mistakes, hide corruption and make bad policies look good.

But let an investigative reporter make a mistake or wrongly condemn someone in authority, and there are howls of outrage. Perhaps we may be excused, therefore, if we occasionally remind our readers who has been telling them the truth.

On March 21, 1972, for example, we reported that International Telephone and Telegraph had feared its assets in Chile might be nationalized if Salvador Allende, a Marxist, were installed as President.

To protect its investments, ITT had tried to inveigle the U.S. government to help subvert Chile's constitutional processes. ITT and the CIA had actually plotted together to "create economic chaos in Chile," we reported, "hoping this would cause the Chilean army to pull a coup that would block Allende from coming to power."

White House aides and CIA officials alike categorically denied that the plot against Allende was anything more than an ITT pipe dream. But now, sworn testimony has established that the CIA schemed against Allende not only before but after he became President.

We began another series of columns on May 1, 1972, charging that the FBI, CIA and Secret Service kept dossiers on the private lives of prominent Americans.

Patrick Gray, the acting FBI chief, called a press conference to deny it. "There are no dossiers or secret files," he declared. We responded on May 11 that we would be "happy to tell poor Pat, since he's new around the FBI, where some of the secret files are stashed."

Thereafter, we published the file numbers and quoted excerpts from secret dossiers on political figures, movie stars, football heroes and newsmen. The existence of these FBI-CIA dossiers, of course, is no longer disputed.

Each new development in the unfolding story of the CIA assassination attempts also confirms the details that we first published in a series of columns beginning January 17, 1971. The plotters whom we named have now confessed their participation.

Yet our columns about the assassination plots were summarily denied and dismissed 4½ years ago. "No plot was authorized or implemented to assassinate (Cuban Premier Fidel) Castro, (Dominican dictator Rafael) Trujillo or anyone else," lied former CIA chief John McCone in 1971.

On Nov. 8, 1974, we reported that "military intervention" against Middle East oil sheikhdoms had been discussed at the highest Washington levels "as a

last resort" to save the West from "economic ruin." The State Department professed to be aghast at such an idea.

But the following Jan. 2, no less than Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger acknowledged that force might be used — only in the "greatest emergency," of course — to prevent the "strangulation of the industrial world."

Again, we warned on May 27, 1974, that the Greek military junta was in imminent danger of collapse, the State Department pooh-poohed our report. The junta fell two months later.

The political prevaricators have had to swallow dozens of denials since we took over the column in August, 1969. The Chappaquiddick affair was then in the headlines. We reported on Aug. 8 that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) had arranged for his cousin, Joe Gargan, to take the blame for driving his car off the bridge.

Our story was not only denied but derided. Yet five years later, the Boston Globe assigned a squad of reporters to reinvestigate the incident. They spent several weeks examining every available detail. Their most fascinating finding: "In particular, Kennedy's cousin, Joseph Gargan, agreed at one point to take responsibility for the accident."

The latest attack upon our ac-

curacy has come from Sen. Hiram Fong (R-Hawaii), who called "totally false" our report that he was fronting for the patent lobby. Yet on June 2, his patent aide, Robert Seto, confided in a memo that Fong's patent bill had been written by the patent lobby.

"The actual wordings essentially are from papers submitted to me by such organizations as the American Patent Law Association, the American Bar Association... and by members of various (industry-dominated) patent committees, PPG (Pittsburgh Plate Glass) industries and others who submitted papers and/or letters," wrote Seto.

In other words, the Fong amendments were written by patent lawyers and the industries they serve. Among the corporations that contributed their views were Phillips Petroleum, Westinghouse, Dow Chemical and Allis-Chalmers, to name a few. All would profit from Fong's bill.

Fong's six-page attack on us on the Senate floor is full of falsehoods and distortions.

The politicians on Capitol Hill have promoted truth in lending and truth in advertising. The greater need is for truth in politics.

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Jack Anderson

## Did the Castro Plot Backfire?

The late Robert Kennedy was tormented by the terrible thought, according to intimates, that he may have helped trigger the assassination of his brother.

We raised this possibility in January 1971, when we first revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us 1½ years to get the rest of the story.

Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, rushing to defend his memory, have sworn that he knew nothing about the assassination attempts and, contradictorily, that he put a stop to them. Both accounts are incorrect, according to sources with an intimate knowledge of the events.

Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother.

The preparations to knock off Castro began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs planning. President Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco, swore to friends afterward that he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Instead, he appointed his brother, Robert, to oversee the CIA, with instructions to shake it up. Characteristically, Robert began investigating the undercover operations from top to bottom. His purpose was to prevent another Bay of Pigs.

He became fascinated, say our sources, with the CIA's covert activities. Eagerly, he pursued the details down through the lower levels. As one source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed schoolboy."

In the process, he learned about the continuing effort to eliminate Castro, an operation known inside the CIA as the "executive action plan." In fact, Robert took a special interest in the

activities against Castro. One insider, former Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatrick, told us the focus "on the Cuban situation" was intensified in 1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence." The President eventually put Robert in charge of a counter-insurgency committee, called the Special Group, which concentrated upon harassing Castro. One member, former CIA chief John McCone, acknowledged that the group had "directed mischievous things against Castro like infiltrating saboteurs, blowing up bridges and carrying on general confusion."

McCone insisted, however, that "the group at no time gave any consideration to any assassination plot." We have established that the "executive action plan" was directed by William Harvey, the CIA operative whom we linked to the assassination plot in our original 1971 story. We have also learned that he reported to the late Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquarters. We have been unable, however, to identify the next link in the chain of command.

Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources insist that Robert Kennedy knew about the plot against Castro and did nothing to stop it. The intended target, Fidel Castro, also knew about it. One assassination squad reportedly was apprehended on a Havana roof top within range of Castro's movements, about March 1, 1963.

The Cuban premier, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker the following September, warned that U.S. leaders would find themselves in danger if they attempted to do away with Cuban leaders.

"United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe," Castro told Harker.

Two months later, President Kennedy was shot down in the streets of Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy a few weeks earlier.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA director John McCone, who remained alone with Robert at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours. All others, including Robert's priest, were turned away. But McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the agonizing three hours.

Other sources say that Robert, in conclusion for the next few days, although he bottled up his feelings, they

knew him and understood the circumstances well enough to realize he blamed himself for his brother's death. There was little doubt, they say, that he believed the CIA's attempts against Castro put into motion the forces that brought about his brother's martyrdom.

On January 18, 1971, we reported: "Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy."

It has now been disclosed that the Warren Commission was told nothing about the CIA's plot to kill Castro even though the late Allen Dulles, the CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on the commission.

According to the final report, the commission investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and the Cuban government" but found no substance to any of them.

The Cuban premier himself, in an interview with Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, emphatically denied having anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

"It is . . . very interesting that this man Oswald, who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit," said Castro.

"But I ask myself why would a man who commits such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I am under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States and that it was all a result of a conspiracy . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries."

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# The Kennedy Administration and the CIA

By M. STANTON EVANS

Liberal spokesmen voicing outrage about U.S. involvement in political assassinations have discovered that the issue is a two-edged sword with cutting power against their own political interests.

As evidence on the subject is pieced together, it appears that official encouragement of this unsavory practice reached its high point, not under Richard Nixon or even Lyndon Johnson, but under liberal favorite John F. Kennedy. Indeed, the data made public so far on high-level plotting against the rulers of other nations all concern the Kennedy years. Three episodes have recently been aired:

1. Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, a former high-ranking official in the Pentagon, has stated that in the summer of 1962 Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy ordered him to start a CIA project working out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban premier Fidel Castro. Lansdale told the *Washington Star* that Kennedy gave him this order outside the regular CIA chain of command, and that he relayed it to CIA official William K. Harvey.

The *Star* also reports that a former CIA official confirms Lansdale's statement, asserting that Kennedy went to Lansdale because the President and his brother mistrusted the leadership of the CIA. Lansdale said that Robert Kennedy did not use the word "assassination," but that there was little doubt "the project for disposing of Castro envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him."

Lansdale explained that the Kennedy contact came during the Cuban missile buildup when there was growing concern about the presence of Soviet military advisers and a possible ICBM force on the island. He added that he instructed Harvey to prepare "contingency" plans for "disposing of" Castro because he wanted to know if the United States had the capability for such an operation.

2. It is reported that the Kennedy regime, working both sides of the Caribbean, was also involved in the assassination of Castro's bitter enemy, Pres-

ident Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Trujillo was gunned down on a lonely highway May 30, 1961, six weeks after the abortive invasion at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. According to a recent write-up in the *New Republic*, this, too, was a CIA job, with apparent guidance from the highest levels.

In its June 28 issue, the *New Republic* reprints a 1963 dispatch detailing moves by which the CIA allegedly funneled arms to Trujillo's assassins. In an accompanying up-date the magazine adds that the original draft of the 1963 piece said "President Kennedy knew of and approved plans to bump off Trujillo," but that this reference had been deleted. The *New Republic* further relates that *Time* and the *New York Post* knew the story of the CIA's involvement but did not print it.

The magazine says the manuscript alleging CIA and Kennedy involvement in the Trujillo killing had first been submitted to liberal columnist William Shannon of the *Post* (now with the *New York Times*). The *Post* wasn't buying, so Shannon passed the article along to the *New Republic*, suggesting according to the author that the Kennedy reference be excluded. The *New Republic* concludes that "relations between the press and President Kennedy, everyone now recognizes in retrospect, were too chummy."

3. Finally, there is little question that the Kennedy regime was responsible for the overthrow and subsequent death of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in November 1963. The essential facts on this one were reported at the time by the late Marguerite Higgins, but were largely ignored until the revelation of the Pentagon Papers and the recent uproar about the CIA. In a nutshell, Kennedy and various of his advisers had become convinced Diem should go, and gave the green light to military plotters to stage a coup.

Principal actors in this scenario were President Kennedy himself, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman. To their credit, both Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and CIA Director John McCone opposed the coup—though

ing outside of regular channels this doesn't tell us whether elements of the CIA were involved or not. The Kennedy group reportedly didn't want Diem killed, but the overthrow they encouraged led directly to that result.

Moreover, certain of the pro-coup faction, most notably Hilsman, envisioned the possible liquidation of Diem with great equanimity. As noted by former Johnson aide John Roche, Hilsman sent a memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Aug. 30, 1963, setting forth a number of possible actions by Diem and recommended American responses. Among other things this memo said:

"We should encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and to destroy the palace if necessary to gain victory;... unconditional surrender should be the terms for the Ngo family, since it will otherwise seek to outmaneuver both the coup forces and the U.S. If the family is taken alive, the Nhush should be banished to France... Diem should be treated as the generals wish."

The pattern emerging from these stories is not only shocking, it also casts considerable doubt on the theory that such activities should be condoned on the grounds of "national security" or anti-communism. Two of the three foreign rulers targeted for extinction in these reports were themselves anti-Communists, and they happen to be the two that wound up dead.

# Jesuit: 'I Got \$10 Million Covert From'

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Following a White House meeting with President John F. Kennedy in 1963, a Belgian Jesuit priest was given \$5 million in under-the-table CIA money to support anti-Communist labor unions throughout Latin America and back the presidential campaign of Eduardo Frei in Chile.

The incident was related by an American Jesuit friend of Belgian Rev. Roger Vekemans as an example of the CIA's relations with missionaries and other overseas representatives of religious groups.

The Rev. James Vizzard said he was having lunch with Vekemans at a restaurant near Dupont Circle when a White House automobile picked up the Belgian for a meeting with Kennedy, Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, CIA Director John McCone and Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver.

AFTER VEKEMANS' session at the White House, Vizzard related, "Roger came back with a big grin on his face and he said, 'I got \$10 million — \$5 million overt from AID (Agency for International Development) and \$5 million covert from the CIA.'"

Vizzard said he has no reason to believe that the CIA ever asked Vekemans to do anything that he would not have done anyway in attempting to carry out orders from his superiors in Rome to support social development in Latin America. It was just a case of the CIA helping to finance a program that fit in with the agency's objectives.

Almost from its inception in 1947, the CIA has used religious groups both as a source of information and as a conduit for funds. CIA spokesmen declined to discuss the CIA-church connection in any detail but other sources said the relationship was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s at least. Some sources said it may be used less frequently today.

SOURCES SAID the CIA dealt with religious groups in Latin America, Africa, Asia and elsewhere.

A spokesman for the Senate select intelligence committee said the

panel's staff is investigating complaints that the CIA has had improper dealings with missionaries.

The spokesman said some of the accusations resulted from CIA activities in Bolivia. He said the charge included "tapped phones, dossie and improper use of priests."

"The committee is interested whatever it can get on this matter," the spokesman said.

Dr. Eugene Stockwell, assistant general secretary of the National Council of Churches for overseas missions, said he has personal knowledge of two cases in which missionaries provided intelligence information to the CIA. But he said they occurred 14 years ago.

HOWEVER, Stockwell said his organization is warning missionaries that the CIA may try to contact them. He said it is important that overseas churchmen not be gullible enough to inadvertently provide information to intelligence agencies.

"I personally would hope that missionaries would not provide information of this kind," he said in a telephone interview.

David A. Phillips, once the chief of the CIA's Latin Americans operations, remarked, "CIA people go to church, too."

"Over the past 25 years in Latin America, CIA people have been in contact to mutual advantage with some of the many fine churchmen who work in the area," said Phillips, who has been attempting to respond to criticism of the agency since he retired from active service earlier this year.

"THIS DOES NOT surprise or shock me," he added. "On the contrary, any information gathering organization would be derelict if it did not take advantage of the in depth expertise of American clerics working in the area."

But Phillips insisted that overseas contacts with missionaries declined in recent years.

scruples about using religious figures.

ACCORDING to the Rockefeller Commission report, the CIA routinely contacts American citizens returning from abroad to determine if they can provide useful information. The commission said the agency attempts to contact all Americans except for students and Peace Corps volunteers.

A CIA official confirmed that there is no prohibition on contacting missionaries, either those who are taking brief home leave or those who are returning to the United States to stay. He refused to discuss specifics but he left little doubt that missionaries are routinely asked for information.

The official emphasized that in contacting returning Americans, CIA representatives always identify themselves fully and stress that the interview is voluntary.

NEVERTHELESS, some returning missionaries have expressed shock at having been questioned by the CIA.

The CIA official said he knows of no instance in which churchmen were asked for information while they were working in foreign countries.

But former State Department intelligence officer John Marks said such contacts have been made.

Marks, a CIA critic who is director of the CIA project at the Center for National Security Studies,



## CIA-Mafia Effort?

# Two Plots to Kill Castro

By Norman Kempster  
 Washington Star Staff Writer

A former high-ranking CIA official says there were at least two separate CIA-Mafia plots to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, one of them beginning in 1960 and ending in 1961 and the second beginning in 1962 and continuing at least until 1963.

Lawrence R. Houston, who was CIA general counsel for 26 years prior to his retirement in 1973, said he informed former Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy of the scheme in the spring of 1962 at a time when he thought it had been "aborted."

Houston said Kennedy, who apparently was hearing of the plot for the first time, angrily issued orders to "break contact" with the Mafia group that included Sam Giancana and John Roselli.

BUT DESPITE Kennedy's order, Houston said the plot was resumed later in 1962 with a different CIA "case officer" but the same group of mobsters.

Houston's account, told to a group of reporters yesterday, filled in a few of the blanks in what is known about the plan to kill Castro. But it left

## Rep. Don Edwards Quits CIA Probe Unit

Rep. Don Edwards has resigned from the newly reconstituted House committee investigating the CIA and other intelligence-gathering federal agencies.

Named to replace him on the 13-member panel was Rep. William Lehman, D-Fla. House Speaker Carl Albert appointed Lehman to the vacancy yesterday.

Edwards, D-Calif., cited other responsibilities in connection with his chairmanship of a Judiciary subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights for leaving the CIA committee.

Edwards was one of the most liberal members of the intelligence committee, but took no public role in the recent dispute that led last week to a reorganization of the panel.

unanswered the most intriguing question — was the plot authorized by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, or did the CIA act on its own?

This is the chronology that Houston outlined:

- In 1960, the final year of the Eisenhower administration, Sheffield Edwards, former head of the CIA's office of security, contacted Giancana and Roselli. Edwards was introduced to the mobsters by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent and then an aide to billionaire Howard Hughes.

- Edwards worked out a plan to kill Castro with the mobsters. Of course, this and subsequent plots were unsuccessful

- Sometime in late 1961, the plot was aborted. Houston said he does not know who turned it off.

- In the spring of 1962 — Houston said he thought it was in April — Houston and Edwards described the plan to Robert Kennedy who had been assigned by his brother, the President, to ride herd on the CIA following the Bay of Pigs debacle.

- Kennedy reacted angrily to the news that the CIA had dealt with the Mafia. Kennedy was pushing strong measures against organized crime that any government dealings with

organized crime might compromise prosecutions.

- Sometime later in 1962, probably in August or September, the Mafia link was re-established. This time the "case officer" was William Harvey. Houston said Harvey asked Edward for an introduction to Roselli but Edwards refused because of Kennedy's admonition to avoid dealing with the underworld. Houston said he has no way of knowing who reinstated the plan. Houston said his only direct connection with the plot was to accompany Edwards, who died recently, while he reported on the matter first to Asst. Atty. Gen. Herbert J. Miller and later to Kennedy.

Houston said Kennedy was angry about the use of the Mafia, although "he didn't seem very perturbed" about the prospect of killing Castro.

The former CIA official said Kennedy admonished: "If you are going to have anything to do with the Mafia again, come to me first."

Houston said he informed Gen. Marshall S. Carter, then CIA deputy director, of the substance of the report to the attorney general. He said he does not recall why that report went to Carter instead of CIA Director John A. McCone, but he assumes it was because McCone was out of town.

MCCONE HAS said recently that he knew nothing of the Mafia connection at the time, although he learned of it later.

Retired Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, a counterinsurgency expert with strong ties to the CIA, said in an interview with The Washington Star earlier this month that Robert Kennedy directed him in 1962 to prepare contingency plans to "get rid of" Castro. He said he passed the instructions along to Harvey.

Lansdale recanted his account the next day. He said Kennedy never ordered him to plan to kill anyone and that assassination "is not my bag." In a subsequent interview, Lansdale said he could not recall if he had dealt with Harvey.

Lansdale's original story did not explain how he could have launched the Mafia plot, which had begun two years earlier. However, Houston's version explains that Harvey did not become involved until 1962.

Harvey and Roselli have both testified in secret before the Senate select intelligence committee. Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho, said the testimony of Harvey and Roselli did not appear significantly from published accounts of the Mafia plot.

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*Church: A 'Very Real Possibility'*

# Did CIA Plot on Its Own?

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Comparing the CIA to a "rogue elephant on a rampage," the chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee said yesterday it is possible the agency planned assassinations without the knowledge or approval of Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower or John F. Kennedy.

After the committee questioned the final witness in its two-month-long investigation of CIA murder plots abroad, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said the evidence points to a "very real possibility" that the agency acted without White House approval.

Eisenhower's son, former Ambassador John Eisenhower, told reporters after testifying in the committee's closed hearing that if his father had heard of an assassination plan he would have rejected it with "contempt."

KENNEDY'S defense secretary, Robert S. McNamara, and national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, last week issued statements that Kennedy had never approved assassination as an instrument of foreign policy.

Church said earlier that although the committee has found "hard evidence" that the CIA engaged in assassination planning and in actual murder attempts, there was no clear evidence to link either Eisenhower or Kennedy to the plans.

But Church said yesterday the evidence may show the CIA acted without legal authority.

"We have to face the very real possibility that the agency may have been behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage," Church said. "But rather than speculate on that, I think the evidence will have to speak for itself. When the committee issues its report, everyone will have an opportunity to review the evidence."

THE COMMITTEE plans to issue an interim report on assassinations later this month or early in August.

Asked if there was a possibility that assassinations were planned without the knowledge of the CIA director by lower-level agency employees, Church said, "That can best be answered when you have a chance to review the evidence."

Former CIA Director John A. McCone told the committee earlier that he has found records of a plan to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. He said he had not been informed of the plot at the time. McCone said if he had known of the plan, he would

Church has said the committee is investigating assassination plots during a period running from the closing months of the Eisenhower administration until the early months of the Johnson administration.

Underworld figure John Roselli has told the committee of a Mafia-CIA plan to kill Castro during that period.

JOHN EISENHOWER, who was on his father's White House staff, said President Eisenhower's view of assassination was that "it is a rather poor way of running a business because you are going to make a martyr out of the other fellow if you do something like that and no man is indispensable. Now, maybe some would disagree that no man is indispensable but that certainly was his attitude."

"It's like the umpire says, it ain't nothing till I call it, and nothing came to the White House," Eisenhower said.

Former CIA Director Richard Helms also appeared before the Church committee yesterday but he refused to talk to reporters afterward.

Helms said earlier that the CIA only acts in response to the wishes of the White House.

Asked about Helms' statement, John Eisenhower said his father was never alone with the CIA director "except for one short period of 10

minutes." During all other meetings with the CIA head, John Eisenhower said, the President was accompanied by aides unconnected with the agency.

ALTHOUGH the committee has not begun to write its report on assassinations, it already has begun to take testimony on the next phase of its inquiry — clandestine CIA attempts to manipulate events in other countries.

The first example of clandestine operations to be examined was the CIA effort to undermine the government of Marxist President Salvador Allende of Chile. Allende died in a coup that overthrew his regime in 1973.

Church also said the committee plans to investigate illegal CIA mail opening. He said that probably will be a topic to be considered when the committee holds public hearings in the fall.

"You know, we have to put a stop to that," he said. "You know it is not only illegal, it is outrageous."

The Rockefeller Commission report said the CIA's mail-opening project was ended in 1973.

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## THE CIA

## The Assassination Plot That Failed

*Of all the charges of wrongdoing by the Central Intelligence Agency, the most disturbing are those that implicate the agency in plots to assassinate foreign rulers who were deemed inimical to U.S. interests. Among the putative targets were Congolese Nationalist Leader Patrice Lumumba and Dominican Republic Dictator Rafael Trujillo, who were assassinated in 1961; South Viet Nam President Ngo Dinh Diem, who was murdered in 1963; and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. The allegations are being investigated by a Senate committee, which last week continued to question past and present CIA officers about the alleged plots. At TIME's request, Charles J.V. Murphy, a former editor and Washington correspondent of FORTUNE, talked with his long-time sources in the U.S. intelligence field about the charges and sent this report:*

The suspicion is that two Presidents—Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy—authorized or condoned foul plots by the CIA to do in several foreign leaders. Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, who heads the Senate investigating committee, has claimed to have "hard evidence" of the agency's complicity but nothing that would implicate any President. Still, in the singular relationship of the agency to presidential authority, evidence of a CIA assassination plot would seem to implicate one President or the other, even both, unless, of course, the CIA had become a law unto itself. What the Rockefeller commission report revealed was "in all likelihood just the tip of the iceberg," according to Church. The real likelihood is that so far as the actual assassinations are concerned, there was never much more to this floating body than a deceptively shimmering tip. Castro, however, was another matter. The agency version of the charges is this:

**TRUJILLO.** Former senior officers of the CIA maintain that neither the agency nor Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy had anything directly to do with the dictator's death. Officials in the American embassy had tried to persuade Trujillo to resign to end the domestic unrest that the U.S. feared might make the country ripe for Communism. They had also been gingerly in touch with leaders of the political opposition and as a token of the American interest

faction with three rifles. A group of seven or eight men ambushed Trujillo on the road from his house to the presidential palace. Whether any of the U.S. supplied rifles were used in the killing has never been determined to the senior CIA men's satisfaction.

**LUMUMBA.** The Soviet Union supported him with money and arms in the contest to take the former Belgian Congo out of the West's orbit. While the CIA supported President Moïse Tshombé of Katanga against Lumumba, it had no part in Lumumba's arrest and murder by Katangese soldiers. He was a casualty of African tribal politics.

**DIEM.** The coup against Diem was

ILLUSTRATION BY



ARTIST'S DEPICTION OF CUBA'S FIDEL CASTRO AS TARGET. Perhaps the man in Havana got cold feet.

Office of Security. Edwards passed the idea on to Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr.

He instructed Edwards to explore the feasibility of the project. For help, Edwards turned to a former FBI agent and later Howard Hughes associate, Robert A. Maheu. Maheu, then a private consultant and investigator, was believed to have a line to Mafia interests that had operated gambling casinos in Havana. Through the connection, Edwards sought to find out whether the Mafia could produce, if need be, a man in Havana in a position to liquidate Castro.

Through Chicago Mafia Chieftain Sam Giancana, who was murdered last week in his suburban Chicago home, and his lieutenant, John Roselli, the CIA recruited a gangster reputed to be in Castro's entourage of bullyboys. In late September Bissell and Edwards informed Director Allen Dulles of the results of their tentative explorations. Bissell maintains that his discussion with Dulles was in the most general terms; he was merely encouraged to test the ground further.

The medical section of the CIA produced some exotic pills and even "fixed" a box of fine Havana cigars. The cigars seem never to have left the laboratory, but the pills were turned over to the Mafia. The would-be assassin was to have been paid \$150,000 if he succeeded; some earnest money, "a few thousand dollars," was turned over to him. Roselli expected something more important than money: both were under investigation by the Department of Justice and hoped to escape

planned with the knowledge of Dean Rusk and Averell Harriman at the State Department, Robert S. McNamara and Roswell Gilpatric at the Defense Department and the late Edward R. Murrow at the U.S. Information Agency. The U.S. hoped Diem's overthrow would halt the domestic turmoil that had weakened South Viet Nam. But the CIA's director, John A. McCone, vigorously opposed the overthrow of Diem on the grounds that none of the generals op-

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Give a little, protect a lot

# CIA report: dirty tricks, Rocky style

by CARL DAVIDSON

Nelson Rockefeller pulled off one of the biggest "dirty tricks" of them all last week with the release of his official report on the Central Intelligence Agency.

The vice president's "Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States" confirmed many of the charges made in recent exposes of the agency and pointed out that its massive domestic spying activities, conducted by a secret division called "Operation CHAOS," was mainly aimed at insurgent movements of the American people.

Nonetheless, the commission did an overall whitewash job on the CIA, especially in covering up its role in political assassinations. In addition, the panel urged the Ford administration to implement a bevy of "reforms" that would strengthen and expand the power of monopoly capital's secret police—all in the guise of rectifying the CIA's mistakes and "protecting" the people's democratic rights.

"Whenever the activities of a government agency exceed its authority," states the summary of the 299-page report, "individual liberty may be impaired. Individual liberties likewise depend on maintaining public order at home and in protecting the country against infiltration from abroad and armed attack."

Public scepticism in the wake of the Watergate affair, however, was a key factor compelling the panel to substantiate many of the "domestic spying" charges.

What are the charges that have been confirmed? Those contained in the report alone reveal that the CIA today cannot measure up to the claims made at its founding in 1947 when, stated the panel, "Congress sought to assure the American public that it was not establishing a secret police which would threaten the civil liberties of Americans. It specifically forbade the CIA from exercising 'police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.'"

## MASSIVE DOMESTIC SPYING

But at the center of the commission's minimal "criticisms" of the CIA is its account of "Operation CHAOS," the agency's label for its massive and secret domestic spying operation revealed in part by the New York Times six months ago.

"Operation CHAOS" was established in August 1967 in order to combat the "growing domestic disorder" of the Black liberation struggle and the antiwar and student movements, says the report, and "it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on domestic dissidents and their activities."

"During six years," it compiled some 13,000 different files, including files on 7200 American citizens. The documents in these files and

related materials included the names of more than 300,000 persons and organizations, which were entered into a computerized index."

"Commencing in 1969," the report then adds, "Operation CHAOS used a number of agents to collect intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with American dissident groups. In order to have sufficient 'cover' for these agents, the operation recruited persons from domestic dissident groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with such groups in this country."

There in brief is official confirmation of a fact the left has long maintained: the CIA is a secret police organization that, contrary to the law and its own charter, aims its reactionary activity against the people's movements at home as well as abroad. Other related exposes in the report include the following:

- The CIA has employed wiretaps, burglaries, buggings and the illegal use of tax records against dissident Americans.

- The CIA illegally "intercepted" more than 4 million pieces of mail a year from the Soviet Union and China over several years, opening and photographing tens of thousands of them in the process.

- The CIA maintained a "drug-testing" program over a 10-year period to determine the usefulness of various substances in breaking the mental resistance of its targets. One agent killed himself after being administered a dose of LSD without his knowledge.

- The CIA maintained a system of monitoring telephone calls between individuals here and in Europe and Latin America.

- The CIA developed illegal relationships with several local police departments, which included training programs in intelligence work, routine payment of "gratuities," the "lending" of CIA agents and equipment for police work and the use of police officers during CIA break-ins.

- The CIA established over a period of 20 years an agreement with the Justice Department which exempted any CIA agent from criminal investigation or prosecution.

## GIVE A LITTLE, SAVE A LOT

The disclosure of these items more than confirms the exposures of the agency initiated by the New York Times late last year. At the same time, to curb further revelations, the Ford administration is brazenly indulging in a well-worn ploy of the Nixon White House—giving up a little to protect a lot.

"There are aspects of this material that should never be permitted to come out," said a White House staff member, commenting in the June 23 Newsweek on information that had turned up "independently of the commission."

"Only the tip of the iceberg" was the phrase used by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), head of the Senate team investigating the agency, after reading the report. This was also backed up by Newsweek, which noted that an "expert estimate" said the panel had focused on "no more than 5 or 6% of the CIA's activities."

Even the items admitted in the report were constrained. "It left details undetailed and names unnamed," said Newsweek. "It entrusted the work of reform largely to the agency itself and to the White House—often collaborators in the abuses of the past."

The "work of reform," however, is the most insidious aspect of the panel's report. Its aim is to shore up and strengthen the CIA. The agency's main task—the export of counterrevolution—is never challenged in the report and is viewed as quite "legal" despite its secrecy.

continued

# The Politics Of Assassination

By Tad Szulc

"... The commission may have found out—that the CIA had planned to murder China

The politics of assassination is a relatively new phenomenon in American politics. But it is a political weapon with two cutting edges. One is the simple act of assassination for political purposes at home and abroad. The Warren commission decided, for example, that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone when he killed John Kennedy in Dallas, but it could not rule out the possibility that Oswald was politically motivated. Similarly, it is assumed that Sirhan Sirhan had some political motivation in shooting Bobby Kennedy in Los Angeles in 1968. And to plot the death of foreign leaders—Premier Castro of Cuba, say—is to make a political decision, whether the plotting is done by elected officials of the U.S. government or at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The other cutting edge of the politics of assassination is the use of *knowledge* of assassinations, or assassination plots, to damage past and present governments. Who gains depends on who is playing this game. One thinks of the attempt by E. Howard Hunt, the convicted Watergate "plumber," to falsify, while working in the Nixon White House, a series of telegrams to show that President Kennedy had ordered the assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November, 1963.

The politics of assassination is clearly the legacy of murders and attempted murders of national leaders reaching back to the cold war era of the 1950's. The plots against Castro, the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy—we have become accustomed to mysteries, accustomed to conclusions with loose ends untied.

In the past five months, the politics of assassination has been on view in the handling of charges that the CIA plotted political murder in pursuit of presumed American foreign-policy objectives. In these months, the conduct of the Rockefeller commission, whose

duty it became to look into these charges, had at least one decidedly political aspect. While the commission finally chose not to get to the bottom of the assassination charges, it appeared to have tolerated enough leaks to the media to suggest that if there were any CIA murder plots, they were hatched at the direction of John and Bobby Kennedy.

The politics of assassination, as played in Washington today, is especially obvious in the running controversy between the Rockefeller commission, chaired by Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, who has not ceased to run for president in seventeen years, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, headed by Frank Church of Idaho, a potential Democratic presidential candidate in 1976.

Rockefeller's commission refused, finally, to report on the subject despite an extra two months' time allotted to it by President Ford for this purpose. Church, whose painstaking investigation is very much centered on assassinations, says that he has "hard evidence" of CIA murder plots.


The Rockefeller commission's handling of foreign assassinations is, in fact, a kind of classical case study in the politics of assassination. Its decision to skirt the whole subject because "time did not permit a full investigation" immediately became a burning political issue, with both the White House and the Rockefeller panel being charged with a cover-up.

Ford, to be sure, promised to give the materials on assassinations gathered by the commission to appropriate congressional committees and to the attorney general for further investigation. But the real outcome of this maneuvering was that the presidential commission was spared the necessity of addressing itself to the hottest, and the most politically dangerous, aspects of the CIA inquiry. When the Church committee

presents its conclusions, probably early in 1976, the White House might well accuse the Democratic majority of playing politics with assassination in an election year. This, the White House might well hope, could defuse the danger posed by Church's investigation. The politics of assassination is also a vicious circle.

The whole CIA affair to date probably did nothing to enhance the stature of Nelson Rockefeller in terms of his vice-presidential (if not presidential) ambitions in 1976. As a congressional observer remarked last weekend, "The CIA investigation may turn out to be Rockefeller's political Bay of Pigs."

Why Ford should have saddled Rockefeller with the investigation in the first place is a reasonably interesting



# Senate Probers Recalling Colby On CIA Plots

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Senate investigators recalled CIA Director William Colby for more questions about assassination plots as the House struggled to find a way through the internal impasse that has blocked the part of its intelligence probe.

The Senate committee and Colby as its first witness last month, but it decided to question him again after taking testimony from former directors John McCone and Richard Helms.

But as the Senate investigation continued under strict secrecy rules, House leaders searched for a possible compromise in a bitter dispute between Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of its Select Committee on Intelligence, and a majority of the Democrats on the committee.

AT THE REQUEST of House Speaker Carl Albert, the House Rules Committee has temporarily postponed consideration of a resolution that would abolish the intelligence committee and scrap the whole investigation.

An aide to Albert said the speaker hoped to work out an agreement that would resolve the dispute without abolishing the committee.

Albert reportedly believed that cancellation of the investigation would be considered a cover-up of CIA law violations.

Meanwhile, President Ford's spokesman indicated the White House is also becoming sensitive to cover-up charges.

"Any suggestion that this President is trying to hide something just doesn't add up," Press Secretary Ronald Nessen said yesterday. "He hasn't anything to hide. He wasn't involved in

But Nessen said Ford was also concerned at news reports of bits and pieces of the evidence the White House is assembling concerning CIA-sponsored assassination plots.

NESSEN said that when information is provided "by dribs and drabs, the people get a not-complete version of what went on."

Roderick Hills, the presidential counsel who is handling the White House CIA investigation, said yesterday his staff is conducting a "top-to-bottom" search of National Security Council records of U.S. policy in the Caribbean.

Hills declined to say whether the assassination of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro had been discussed in the NSC. But he said the entire history of NSC actions between 1959 and 1963 was relevant to the investigation.

"If you look at the NSC minutes over four years you could determine who was responsible for what," Hills said.

McCone said following his appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he had found evidence that the CIA had planned an attempt on Castro's life under "authority" granted in the closing months of the Eisenhower administration and early in the Kennedy administration.

BUT McCONE did not say who had granted the authority, which he said was prior to his tenure as CIA chief.

The House CIA investigation reached a deadlock Monday when the House overwhelmingly refused to accept Nedzi's resignation as chairman as had been demanded by a majority of the Democrats on the committee.

The matter was referred to the Rules Committee after Rep. B.F. Fisk, D-Calif., introduced a resolution to dissolve the committee.

Albert asked a delay in the hope of working out a compromise, although both Nedzi and the dissident Democrats indicated that an agreement was doubtful.

Meanwhile, the House Ethics Committee met briefly to consider the case of one of Nedzi's most outspoken critics, Rep. Michael Harrington, D-Mass.

THE HOUSE Armed Services Committee voted Monday to deny Harrington classified information because he had discussed in public supposedly secret testimony concerning a CIA plot to destabilize the government of the late President Salvador Allende of Chile.

Committee sources indicated a public hearing probably will be held, but no date was set.

A high-ranking FBI official, meanwhile, said foreign intelligence agents are becoming increasingly active on Capitol Hill but have not succeeded in infiltrating any congressional offices.

"We have no indication of any actual infiltration," James B. Adams, deputy associate director, said in a telephone interview yesterday reported.

He said foreign agents are "developing considerable political and economic information" as a result of an increasing number of contacts with members of Congress and their staffs, many of which "are of a clandestine nature" in which the agent poses as an official of a foreign government.

SUCH CONTACTS contrast with actual infiltration, in which a foreign agent would seek to recruit a congressional staff member to gather and pass along information, he said.

His comment was on a Scripps-Howard news service report that the Rockefeller commission in the course of its investigation of the CIA received evidence that Soviet-bloc agents may have infiltrated congressional office or committee staffs.

A White House official with access to evidence turned up by the commission denied the report, saying "there is absolutely no evidence" of infiltration of Congress by the KGB, the Soviet intelligence organization.

Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., a member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, raised the issue Sunday when he said that he hoped the panel would investigate reports he had received from "very, very good sources" of such infiltration.



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# Murder (or Liq

By David Wise

A former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone, was in town a few days ago and remarked to reporters that Fidel Castro's assassination, or "liquidation or disposal, I've forgotten the exact words," was discussed at a high-level meeting that he attended while CIA chief in 1962.

These little details are difficult to recall, especially after the passage of so much time, but McCone's comments demonstrate how casually the subject of political murder has entered the mainstream of public debate in America, a nation that likes to think of itself as the moral leader of free men everywhere. And, although the matter of alleged CIA assassinations of foreign political leaders was deleted from the Rockefeller commission report handed to President Ford last week, the subject will not go away.

The Rockefeller commission's 299-page paperback report, bound in baby blue, makes fascinating reading, but it would have to be rated PG. The really good version, including the X-rated material, has not been released by the President.

Ford explained it this way at his press conference last Monday night: "Because the investigation of the political assassination allegations is incomplete, and because the allegations involve extremely sensitive matters, I have decided that it is not in the national interest to make public material relating to these allegations at this time." Instead, Ford said, he was sending the classified assassination material to the Senate and House committees investigating the CIA and other intelligence agencies; in addition all of the data gathered by the commission will go to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution of individual law-breakers.

In effect, Ford was dumping the explosive assassination issue in the lap of Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate panel. This could be seen as a fairly shrewd political move by Ford, for it was a way for a Republican president to transfer a nettlesome problem from the White House to a committee and a Congress controlled by Democrats. In fairness to Ford, however, there was also some administrative logic to his action, since the

panel was originally established last January to investigate CIA domestic transgressions, not its actions overseas.

A strong counter-argument, of course, is that if the commission has solid evidence of CIA assassination plots or actual killings, the information — even if incomplete — should be made public. The President's failure to do so inevitably raises the question of a cover-up, an unpleasant issue coming so soon after Watergate.

But the great irony of all this, lost to some extent in the controversy over the CIA and the Rockefeller report, is that President Ford himself was responsible for the news leak that created the current political furor over assassinations.

What turned into a comedy of errors began on Jan. 16, when the President lunched privately with Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, and several of the newspaper's senior editors from New York and Washington. Ford was asked why he had appointed so many establishment figures to the Rockefeller commission. He replied, off the record, that he had chosen reliable types because he did not want the commission to go too far and get into the area of assassinations.

Bound to secrecy by the rules that permit press and government to relate to each other in something short of total anarchy, the newspaper, although agonized by the position in which it found itself, did not print the story. But journalists are terrible gossips — it is in the nature of their work — and before long the story found its way to the sharp ears of Daniel Schorr of CBS News, who broadcast a version of Ford's private comments on Feb. 28.

Thus began a spate of news stories about alleged CIA assassination plots, especially those directed at Fidel Castro. Some of these accounts reported that the CIA had hired Mafia figures to murder the Cuban leader. These stories, in turn, generated other stories speculating that President John F. Kennedy might have been assassinated on Castro's orders, in retaliation for alleged CIA plans to kill Castro.

Reporters began dogging Vice President Rockefeller's footsteps, demanding to know whether the commission would investigate CIA assassination allegations. At first, Rockefeller ducked this unwelcome assignment, but finally, on

he confirm would at least explore the aspect of alleged assassination plots by CIA. That left the odd impression, never entirely clarified, that the panel would confine itself to studying only any murder plots hatched within the United States — at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., for example, or in Miami against Castro.

The same day, the story came full circle for President Ford. At a news conference in Indiana, he acknowledged that he had discussed the subject of assassinations with Vice President Rockefeller. Ford added: "I condemn any CIA involvement in any assassination planning or action."

In April, former CIA director Richard Helms emerged from a long interrogation by the Rockefeller commission and snapped "Killer Schorr" at the CBS newsmen, who was waiting outside the hearing room. "As far as I know," said Helms, "the CIA was never responsible for assassinating any foreign leader."

Despite this and other official denials, there have been recurrent, published reports of CIA assassination involvement for years; one of the astonishing aspects of the current controversy is how long it has taken for the matter to become a political issue.

● Item: In 1967, in the book *The Espionage Establishment*, Thomas B. Ross and I reported that when Castro visited New York City in 1960, a CIA agent told New York police that the agency had devised a plan to plant a box of special cigars where Castro might smoke one; when he did, it would explode and blow his head off. But the CIA man explained the plan would not be carried out.

● Item: In August 1970, when the Kennedy Library in Waltham, Mass., was opened to scholars, the New York Times published a story based on a taped interview with former Sen. George A. Smathers, a Kennedy friend. Smathers said he had more than once talked with President Kennedy about "assassination of Fidel Castro, what would be the reaction, how would the people react, would the people be gratified." Smathers said Kennedy "was certain it could be accomplished," but the presi-

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**JACK ANDERSON with LES WHITTEN****Govt. Guests And CIA**

**CIA COVERUP:** Former CIA chief John McCone now has acknowledged a story he denied to us more than four years ago.

In January, 1971, we reported that the CIA had recruited two underworld figures, Sam Giancana and John Roselli, to plan the assassination of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

He identified their CIA contacts as William Harvey and James "Big Jim" O'Connell. The CIA was put in touch with the underworld triggerman, we reported, by billionaire Howard Hughes' former Nevada honcho, Robert Maheu.

The plotters are now being hauled behind closed doors of the Select Senate Intelligence committee to tell what they know.

McCone emerged after three hours of secret testimony to admit cautiously to the press that plots, indeed had been sanctioned to kill Castro.

This was the opposite of what he told us in 1971. "No plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, he told us. We went ahead with the story anyway, and now McCone has acknowledged we were right.

"The plot to knock off Castro," we reported on Jan. 18, 1971, "began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them."

Yet even after the Bay of Pigs, we reported, assassination teams continued to try to eliminate Castro until the end of February, 1963. "Nine months later," we noted, "President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City."

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion — unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings — that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

The Senate committee is investigating also this intriguing possibility that the CIA attempt to kill Castro may have backfired against President Kennedy in Dallas.

No less than the late President's brother, Robert, and successor, Lyndon Johnson, were deeply conscious of this unproved possibility.



By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

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# Delay on CIA Report Raises Credibility Issue

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—President Ford Friday received a 350-page report from the Rockefeller commission with recommendations on the Central Intelligence Agency and a separate packet of "investigative materials" on the CIA's alleged role in assassination plots.

The report, representing a five-month investigation by the blue-ribbon panel headed by Vice President Rockefeller, is understood to focus on the CIA's future role and on charges that it engaged in illegal domestic spying.

In accepting the report, Mr. Ford said it would help assure "that we end up with a CIA and an intelligence community that will do an excellent job for the future of this country and at the same time ensure the privacy of individuals."

White House officials said they expected the report to be made public in several days.

The issue of alleged plans for assassinations in foreign countries was not dealt with in the report itself because the commission decided that it could not do a thorough enough job in the time allotted, Rockefeller said.

However, stripping the report of the assassination material or refusing to make it public clearly will raise questions of credibility, not only about the commission and its report but about the motives of the Ford Administration.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, criticized the Rockefeller commission for avoiding the assassination issue.

"Clearly the Rockefeller commission had a choice," said Church. "It could deal with the assassination issue or duck it. Evidently it has decided to duck it."

He said he did not "quite under-

stand the footwork that seems to be taking place right now. I'd rather not speculate on the motivation or the reasons for it."

Church, described as "strange" the possibility that the Rockefeller report would be withheld from the public.

"It is my purpose to make a public disclosure of all the facts that come to our (the Senate committee's) attention," Church said.

Meanwhile, former CIA Director John A. McCone told reporters that there were "certain actions which were either planned or some actually undertaken" against the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in the early 1960s.

McCone, after testifying for three hours at a closed session of Church's committee, said that anti-Castro operations had been approved "both at the close of the Eisenhower administration and the early part of the Kennedy administration." But he added: "I don't know the source of the authority."

He confirmed that in August, 1962, top Kennedy administration officials—including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—had discussed but dismissed the possibility of assassinating Castro.

But a high Defense Department official subsequently wrote a memo providing the CIA with authority to begin contingency planning for the possible assassination of Castro, McCone said. He said this memo had been "erroneous" and "was changed immediately."

Church disclosed later that he had evidence linking the CIA to plots against foreign leaders other than Castro.

"The assassination problem is not confined to Mr. Castro," he told reporters.

Church said he was not sure whether former President John F. Kennedy and former Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy had been involved in planning foreign assassinations.

"The evidence is quite confusing on

this question," Church said.

Speaking to newsmen, Rockefeller said: "We did not feel we had the full story (of the alleged assassination plots) that would give us the basis for making conclusions." He said it was a "reasonable assumption" that the Senate CIA committee—but not the public—would have access to the raw data on this subject that had been turned over to Mr. Ford.

That material is said to include staff interviews with former CIA officials and others, as well as Justice Department files bearing on reports that the CIA cooperated with Mafia figures in getting intelligence out of Cuba prior to the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion and in planning attempts to kill Castro in the early 1960s.

The Mafia figures, who had operated lucrative gambling casinos in Havana before Castro came to power, reportedly worked with the CIA because they hoped that they would be able to resume gambling operations if Castro were ousted and because they wanted to recover more than \$450,000 in cash they had left in Cuba. At the time, they were under investigation by the Department of Justice.

In his remarks to reporters, Rockefeller rejected newsmen's suggestions that withholding evidence from the public on the assassination question would be viewed as a coverup.

The CIA report originally was to have been made public this weekend, and, because of comments by Rockefeller and commission member C. Douglas Dillon, it had been expected to deal with the assassination issue.

As late as Wednesday, in response to a statement by Church that the intelligence agency had been involved in "murder plots," Rockefeller said his report would address that question.

But Thursday night the Vice President's office said that the subject had been inadequately investigated by the commission in its rush to meet to-

day's deadline for reporting to Mr. Ford.

Rockefeller aides said Friday that the Vice President, in his statement Wednesday, had not meant to imply that the assassination question would be discussed at length in the report. They said he had been accurate in saying that the question would be addressed because the report will note that the commission looked into it without reaching any conclusions.

"As far as I know," presidential Press Secretary Ron Nessen said, neither the President nor anyone in the administration excluded from the final report.

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# McCone Reveals 'Minor' CIA Plots To Kill Castro

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

Former CIA Director John A. McCone said yesterday both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations sanctioned plots to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Talking to reporters after three hours of secret testimony to the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, McCone said the most serious murder plan was "stopped right after the Bay of Pigs (invasion of Cuba)."

He said the CIA was given the authority to consider killing the Cuban leader "prior to my taking office" as head of the agency. Former President John F. Kennedy appointed McCone in 1961 following the Bay of Pigs debacle. McCone left the agency in 1965.

HE SAID the authority, presumably approved at the White House, was issued in the "latter part of the Eisenhower administration and the early part of the Kennedy administration."

But McCone insisted the plots were "minor" and were "all finally aborted."

Committee Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho, said the lawmakers have collected evidence that the CIA plotted murders of other foreign leaders in addition to Castro and that "in certain cases (there have been) more than simply plans — the actual attempts have been undertaken."

He said there were no actual killings in which "the CIA was directly involved."

WHILE REFUSING to go beyond that statement, Church left no doubt that he had intended to imply that the agency was indirectly involved in successful assassination attempts.

Church indicated that the committee also wants to find out if the CIA played a part in the assassination in 1963 of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. McCone said without elaborating that he was questioned about "the South Vietnam situation in 1963."

McCone, now a California businessman, said he was unaware at the time of plans to kill Castro. But

he said he learned of the plots later. The possible use of assassination "was raised" during his tenure as CIA director, he added, but he rejected it as "contrary to moral standards."

However, McCone urged critics of the anti-Castro plots, to think "in the context of the time" when the Cuban Communist leader was considered to be a major menace to U.S. security.

CHURCH SAID his committee will put the matter into a historical context but "the assassination problem is not confined to Mr. Castro and, therefore, cannot be dismissed on grounds that Castro took action, including making Cuba a missile base in later months, that in retrospect might have justified that extreme step."

Meanwhile, a House select committee on the CIA was embroiled in an internal controversy of its own. A majority of the Democratic members of the committee have demanded the resignation of Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., because his prior knowledge of CIA violations of U.S. law would make it impossible for him to conduct an independent investigation of the agency.

Nedzi said he would not resign but that it might be a good idea for the full House to vote on whether to oust him or have him stay on.

Nedzi's aides were working out a defense strategy keyed to an argument that his activities in overseeing the CIA were well-known at the time Speaker Carl Albert picked him for the select committee job. One aide remarked that the attack on Nedzi was "a repudiation of the speaker, really."

Church's committee has called Robert Maheu, a former aide to billionaire Howard Hughes, to testify Monday. Published accounts of an alleged CIA-Mafia attempt to kill Castro have said

Maheu served as the link between the mob and the CIA.

THE COMMITTEE has issued a subpoena for underworld figure John Roselli to testify later next week about the reported "contract" on Castro's life.

While insisting that his committee will make public in about a month what it has learned about CIA murders, Church indicated the panel probably will shun

televised public hearings of the type conducted two years ago by the Senate Watergate Committee.

"I doubt very much that matters of this kind should be the subject of a television extravaganza to be broadcast day after day to a fascinated world flung audience," Church said.

He said the committee would inform the public in a way that would not "magnify the damage to the United States."

The committee is operating under a "secrecy" rule which forbids members other than Church to talk

about what happens behind its locked doors. Church is permitted to brief reporters in general terms but may not talk about details.

AS A RESULT, questions are often raised that cannot be answered. Church was asked earlier in the day if the committee was convinced that either President Kennedy or his brother, Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, was involved in the assassination plots.

"I'm not, and the evidence is quite confusing on this question," he responded.

McCone, however, seemed to indicate that a number of top officials of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were involved in giving the CIA authority to plan assassinations.

"Most of the people involved are dead," he said. He then listed John Kennedy, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, former CIA Director Allen Dulles, former Secretary of State Christian Herter and others.

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# Former CIA Chief Hints

## At Plots on Fidel's Life

By PAUL HEALY and JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington, June 6. (News Bureau)—Former CIA Director John McCone implied after testifying before Senate probers today that the CIA had been involved in plots to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

"Certain acts were planned or undertaken, all of which were aborted," McCone told reporters. He was quizzed for three hours by the Senate Intelligence Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who has charged that the agency was involved in "actual attempts" to kill foreign leaders.

Earlier, the Rockefeller commission's 300-page report on allegations of CIA domestic spying was formally presented to President Ford — without its unfinished findings about the alleged murder plots.

Vice President Rockefeller told Ford in a brief presentation ceremony that the commission did not have time to deal with the assassination allegations. He said Ford would receive those "materials" separately.

### Will Decide on Release

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen surprised reporters by announcing that Ford would decide whether or not to make the CIA report public after reading it over the weekend. Commission sources had been telling reporters for weeks that Rockefeller wanted the report released, and it had been anticipated that the document would be made public on Sunday.

Nessen insisted there never had been any advance commitment to make the document public and angrily denied any suggestion of a "coverup." But Church argued that "people have a right to know what the government is doing. I just don't understand the footwork that seems to be taking place."

Church said that he still had not been able to determine who in government authorized the alleged CIA murder plots. McCone, CIA director during parts of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, said that he did not know "the source of authority" which was given at the close of the Eisenhower administration

and in the early Kennedy administration.

He said it would be difficult to determine who gave the CIA the orders because "most of the people involved are dead." McCone ticked off a list — Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, former Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen, the first CIA director, and Christian Herter, who succeeded John Foster Dulles.

As cameras recorded the ceremony, Ford received the blue-covered document from Rockefeller in the Oval Office and thanked him and the other seven members of the commission — five of whom were present — for their five months of work.

Ford appointed the commission in December to investigate published charges that the CIA over the years had been guilty of "massive illegal domestic spying." The inquiry later was broadened to include the assassination question.

### Thanks Commission

Nessen said that the data given to Ford would be turned over to the church committee. Earlier today, Church said that alleged CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders "were more than simply plans." He charged that the Rockefeller commission was apparently "ducking that sordid issue."

But Church would not say in a television interview whether he meant the CIA had been involved in the actual murders of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, and other leaders.

Rockefeller told Ford that there were no conclusions about

the assassination angle because:

"We didn't feel we could come to a conclusion on partial information."

### "Important Document"

Ford, noting approvingly that the commission's findings were unanimous, remarked as he looked at the report: "I think it's an important document. It will give us the basis for some firm recommendations to make sure — make positive — that we end up with a CIA and an intelligence community that will do an excellent job for the future of this country and at the same time ensure the privacy of individuals within the Constitution, rules, laws, and so forth."

At another point he said there would be "no question whatsoever" that the CIA and sister agencies would "live within the law." The President added that the thick volume would provide him with a "a long weekend's reading," but he gave no hint on whether or not he was thinking of making it public.

Nessen told reporters that Ford's copy of the CIA report was the only one in the White House and was in "page proof" form. In answer to questions, he stressed that the only White House official who has been keeping in touch with the commission was counsel Philip Buchen.

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said that he would go to the House floor to save his job as chairman. A majority of the Democrats on the panel want him to quit, contending that he failed to take action when he learned a year ago that the CIA was involved in illegal activities.

But Nedzi argued that it would be a "healthy development" if his detractors quit the committee, which meets in a showdown session on Monday.

## WASHINGTON POST

# Plotting On Castro Confirmed

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Central Intelligence Agency Director John A. McCone confirmed yesterday that the CIA planned and undertook some steps to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in the early 1960s.

He said all of the schemes "were aborted" and that the principal effort was stopped soon after the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961.

He said he was not told of the attempts on Castro's life even after he became head of the CIA seven months later.

Speaking with reporters after three hours of closed-door testimony before the Senate intelligence operations committee, McCone said he became aware of the efforts only in the last few months upon reviewing secret CIA files.

The committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), added that Castro was not the only target of CIA assassination schemes.

The committee is investigating reports and allegations of indirect CIA involvement in the assassinations of dictator Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic in 1961 and of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

The CIA has also voiced concern over charges that it may have been connected with the death of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba who was killed in January of 1961.

In an interview on the CBS Morning News, Church said that "no actual assassination took place with which the CIA was directly involved," but he said the agency did make some actual attempts at assassination and indicated that it may have been indirectly tied to others that were aborted.

McCone said he was questioned yesterday not only about Castro, but also about "the South Vietnam situation" in 1963 when Diem was murdered.

He indicated that he had not been able to supply many details about Diem because "I did not expect it to come up" and had not reviewed his notes on that.

Now a Los Angeles business executive, McCone said it is still unclear to him, and apparently to the Senate committee, who gave the orders for the plans to kill Castro.

But he said they were apparently handed down "both at the close of the Eisenhower administration and the early part of the Kennedy administration" in late 1960 and early 1961.

"The authority under which these activities were carried on was authority granted long before my time," said McCone, who was sworn in as CIA director on Nov. 29, 1961. "I was totally unaware of any attempts on Castro."

However, he said that in reviewing various files within the last few months, "I have been aware of certain actions which were either planned or some actually undertaken, all of which are of a minor nature."

McCone said the chain of command for the assassination schemes against Castro was still murky "because the people involved are dead," including Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, former CIA director Allen W. Dulles, and former Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Christian Herter.

Castro's assassination, or "liquidation or disposal, I've forgotten the exact words," McCone said, was raised again at a high-level meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, in light of reports that Soviet-made nuclear missiles were about to be installed in Cuba.

But, McCone said, "it was disposed of immediately at my insistence . . . (It was) quite outside the moral standards of the United States, the CIA and my own standards."

McCone did not say who broached the idea. Others at the meeting with him were

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's adviser on national security affairs. A fifth member of the special high-level group, Attorney General Kennedy, was absent.

Two days after the meeting, Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has said, he drafted contingency plans for dealing with Castro that "may" have included Castro's assassination despite the decision at the meeting. Lansdale has indicated that the orders to draw up the plans came from Robert Kennedy, although Lansdale has stated that he did not know of any plan for Castro's murder as an option.

McCone described the memo as "erroneous" and said it was quickly withdrawn.

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# The Investigator On CIA Assassin

By SAUL FRIEDMAN  
*Inquirer Washington Bureau*

WASHINGTON. — Battles erupted yesterday among some of the investigators of the Central Intelligence Agency and other American spying operations.

Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and his commission gave their report on intelligence activities to President Ford but, under pressure from the White House and criticism from Senate investigator Frank Church, presented information on alleged CIA assassination plots in a separate report.

Church, the Idaho Democrat who heads the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, promised that he would investigate deeply and report on the assassination allegations. And his panel, continuing its regular closed hearings, met yesterday with John McCone, who was CIA director when several of the murders allegedly sanctioned by the agency took place.

McCone acknowledged after the meeting that there were U. S.-sanctioned plots against Fidel Castro in the early 1960s, but he said they were "minor" and ultimately were abandoned.

## In Dark on Plots

Carefully avoiding the word "assassination," McCone said he knew nothing of the Castro plots although he was CIA chief at the time. But he argued that the "hysterical criticism" of CIA activities in that era should be tempered by a realization of Castro's "violent" denunciation of the United States and his efforts to win all of Latin America away from the Western bloc.

Church said, however, that still-secret evidence showed the assassination problem was "not confined" to Castro.

Meanwhile, Chairman Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.) of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, rejected an almost unprecedented demand from fellow Democratic members that he resign or be removed from the chairmanship for allegedly being too close to the CIA.

Nedzi said he was inclined to take the battle to the House floor, but there were indications that he and perhaps other committee members might step aside for the sake of the investigation.

In another development, a group of more than 200 former intelligence agents scheduled a meeting in suburban Washington last night to form the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO) to help defend the CIA and other such American agencies.

## Denies CIA Role

Former CIA operative David Atlee Phillips, who helped direct the 1973 coup in Chile, quit the agency to form the group. He insisted the CIA had no official or unofficial connection with it.

Presidential Press Secretary Ron Nessen acknowledged that the White House had received the Rockefeller commission's 350-page report.

Nessen explained that material on the alleged assassination plots was separated because the commission had been formed only to investigate charges that the CIA, the FBI and other intelligence agencies had engaged in illegal domestic spying. The official report included that evidence only, Nessen said.

Nessen also refused to say when and in what form the report might be made public. He said only that "it was never the White House plan to release the report until the President read it."

Ford had ordered Rockefeller to include assassination allegations as part of his investigation. And he pledged that the report would be made public.

## Hints Conspiracy

Nedzi said he was "mystified" by the sudden move against his chairmanship, apparently led by Robert N. Giaino (D., Conn.), a House regular who had been competing with Nedzi for control of the committee Democrats.

Nedzi even hinted that his troubles might be part of conspiratorial attempts to discredit not only him but the House investigation as well.

"There are strange things going on," Nedzi said, "and I don't know what's behind it."

Nedzi had been accused by other Democrats of not having told them about a briefing he got from the CIA assassinations and attempted political murders sponsored by the agency.

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beral on the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence Operations.

Taking his duties seriously, Nedzi became more familiar than anyone in Congress with the secrets of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

## One-Man Quest

He insisted that his one-man quest for information had resulted in more openness on the part of the agency, had uncovered some past abuses and prevented new ones.

But he said: "My subcommittee was rather conservative, and I got the information from the agencies on condition that it not become public. Some of the information became public, at my request. But some did not, when I thought there were justifiable reasons. Every member of the Armed Services subcommittee had access to the information, and during the course of the current investigation the new select committee would have gotten it."


Nedzi added that he had been chosen as chairman of the select committee at least partly because "of the briefings I had gotten and the knowledge I had. Now I'm being attacked for having gotten that knowledge. I am mystified and wonder why it's happening."

Giaino, who had not been interested in the CIA until recently, was the leader in the effort to take the investigation away from Nedzi's Armed Services subcommittee and give it to a new, select committee. He also sought the chairmanship, although Albert chose Nedzi.

Giaino vetoed Nedzi's choices for staff director of the select committee, and successfully pressured Nedzi into approving Searle Field, from Giaino's home state, Connecticut.

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# Uncloak



No intelligence agency can  
unless it can keep its op  
That's why the investiga  
is so dangerous for U.S. security.

by Charles J. V. Murphy

In the hangman's atmosphere that currently envelops the immediate prospects of the Central Intelligence Agency, an important point has been strangely overlooked. Why was this agency, so rich in intellectual talent, once full of élan, now gravely wounded, created in the first place?

The all-but-forgotten answer is that the CIA was brought into existence by Congress in 1947, at President Truman's request, for the straightforward purpose of preventing another such shocking lapse of vigilance as the one that made possible the disaster at Pearl Harbor, six years earlier.

An inquiry by a joint committee of Congress that lasted through seven re-creation-laden months, from November, 1945, to May, 1946, elicited the embarrassing revelation that all the essential intelligence exposing Japan's preparations for war, even the departure of the Japanese fleet, had come into American hands before the attack. The failure to perceive what was in the making was found, in hindsight, to have re-

sulted from the fact that no agency in the government had ever been charged with pulling such intelligence together.

The fateful political and military clues, in jigsaw pieces, had all been collected by the State, War, and Navy departments, each in its own parochial interest, in the form of radio intercepts, diplomatic dispatches, and routine military intelligence reports. But no one office or person had the authority, or duty, to make a grand assessment for the President, one sharp enough to command a summary alert.

## A question of Soviet intentions

What makes the existing situation strange is that the primary task laid upon the CIA eighteen years ago—to be the watchman of national security—has never been more urgent than it is today. For example, the Soviet Union has in advanced development, even partly in deployment, the most powerful array of strategic nuclear weapons that the military technologies have so far produced. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger,

a professional strategic-weapons analyst not given to exaggeration, describes the array as "quite awesome." It includes four third-generation land-based ICBM prototypes, plus a fifth that has lately appeared on the test range; a bigger and faster missile-armed submarine; and a supersonic bomber having an intercontinental capability. Four of the five ICBM's and the 4,500-mile submarine-launched missile have all been MIRVed—fitted, that is, with from four to eight independently targetable warheads.

If the deployments of these weapons should proceed to the some 2,400 ICBM launchers sanctioned by the SALT agreements of 1972 and 1974, and if the U.S. stands on the weapons it now has in place, the Russians can be expected to end up, four or five years hence, with a superiority in nuclear throw-weight five times, perhaps even six times, greater than the U.S. will have in its order of battle—10 to 12 million pounds for the U.S.S.R. to only two million for the U.S.

Weights and numbers in these magnitudes far surpass anything needed for



NEW YORK TIMES  
30 MAY 1975

# '61 MEMO IS CITED ON C.I.A.-MAFIA TIE

Hoover Is Said to Have Told  
Robert Kennedy of Link  
to 2 Racket Figures

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 29—Robert F. Kennedy knew as early as May 1, 1961, that the Central Intelligence Agency was secretly dealing with the Mafia, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandum now in the hands of the Rockefeller commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The discovery of this new memorandum increases the mystery of whether senior members of the administration of President Kennedy, including his brother the Attorney General, ordered or approved an alleged C.I.A. plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

It is part of a growing pattern of indications, mentioned in press reports over the last two weeks, that a plan to assassinate Mr. Castro was discussed at the highest levels of the Government in the early nineteen sixties and that, with or without approval, the intelligence agency recruited two men with organized crime connections to attempt one such operation.

According to sources familiar with the investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the F.B.I., wrote a detailed secret memorandum to Robert Kennedy in May, 1961, asserting that during an investigation of two racket figures, Sam Giancana and John Roselli, agents had turned up an apparent connection with the C.I.A.

## No Word on Assassination

The memorandum, one source said, went on to note that the F.B.I. requested and received a full C.I.A. briefing about the agency's dealings with Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli. The memorandum, this source said, never mentioned the words "assassination" or "eliminate," a euphemism for assassination often used in spy circles. But the source said Mr. Hoover characterized the reported C.I.A. activities with Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli as "dirty business."

The memorandum is dated almost a year before Robert Kennedy was given a briefing by the intelligence agency on this same subject.

In that briefing, covered in testimony before the Rockefeller commission and in documents, according to reliable sources, the Attorney General appeared to learn of the C.I.A.'s dealings with the Mafia for the first time and admonished the agency official briefing him that the next time the C.I.A. wanted to deal with organized crime it should come to him first.

As a result of this May, 1962, briefing, the Attorney General gave Mr. Hoover further details on the C.I.A. operation and Mr. Hoover wrote a memorandum that was kept in F.B.I. files and was known only to select members of the top echelon of bureau for many years.

## Concern on Blackmail

That memorandum, authoritative sources disclosed last week, is also in the hands of the Rockefeller commission, which is looking into intelligence operations. It reportedly contained Mr. Hoover's concern that Mr. Giancana could "blackmail" the United States Government.

The Associated Press reported last week what appears to be another piece of this puzzle. It quoted authoritative sources who said the Rockefeller commission had obtained the minutes of a meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, attended by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, John A. McCone, then Director of Central Intelligence, and McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's adviser for national security affairs. The meeting, the A.P. report said, included a "discussion" of killing Mr. Castro.

One source told the matter was "immediately dismissed," but the wire service quoted two other sources who said that a memo was written two days later by Mr. McNamara directing the C.I.A. to prepare contingency plans for the "elimination" of Mr. Castro.

Several highly placed sources within the C.I.A. and other intelligence circles of the early nineteen-sixties have said that after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed in April, 1961, there was a major effort to get rid of Mr. Castro. For instance, Newsweek magazine reported that a source described this as an "effort of the Kennedy Administration."

## Authority Unclear

Most intelligence sources of the period appear to be anxious to stress that no plan for either an assassination, kidnapping or coup d'etat would have been brought to an operational level without the authority of the Administration, but the public record is by no means clear.

For instance, one source said that the top of the May, 1961, memorandum disclosed this week, a note had been jotted in what he said was Robert Kennedy's handwriting saying, "Have this followed up vigorously," and that the memorandum bore the handwritten initials "RFK."AL The handwritten note had apparently been retyped by someone in the same period as the memo was written, the source said, apparently to make the note clear to readers. But there is no evidence yet public that it was "followed up vigorously" or what action was taken, if any.

A spokesman for the Senate committee declined to comment on whether the committee had any specific evidence.

This has been the committee's general response. But the spokesman went on to point out that the panel felt that "these leaks are outrageous" and that the question of whether there was a national policy to assassinate foreign leaders, or a plot against Mr. Castro, should be investigated carefully and thoroughly.

"Any partial analysis of evidence is dangerous and harmful," he said. The committee's investigation will not put "reputations in jeopardy"

by a slapdash treatment involving a matter of such importance to national security," he added.

Another Capitol Hill source, however, said the committee had received some material that would be "embarrassing to the brothers Kennedy."

David W. Belin, counsel for the Rockefeller commission, also declined to comment.



24 MAY 1975

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# '62 C.I.A. Castro Plot Reported Following Talks at White House

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

Central Intelligence Agency prepared a "contingency" plan for the assassination of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro as a result of White House discussions, former agency officials have told the Rockefeller Commission, which is looking into Federal intelligence operations.

According to a former senior intelligence official, the commission was told that this "contingency" planning included "feelers" being put out to two organized crime figures, Sam Giancana and John Roselli. The plans, one source said, were examined after top-level officials in the White House of President Kennedy indicated a desire to have the question of assassinating Mr. Castro examined as one possible solution to the growing Cuban problem in 1961 and 1962.

McGeorge Bundy, then assistant to the President for national security affairs, told newsmen several weeks ago that White House officials did have discussions of "how nice it would be if this or that leader" were not around any more.

The former intelligence official, who declined to be identified, said this sort of informal White House thought had resulted in "contingency planning at C.I.A."

He emphasized that what White House officials might have regarded as informal remarks would have been treated as a former request by the C.I.A.

## Reports Subject Dismissed

[The Associated Press quoted its sources as saying that minutes of a meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, showed that it was attended by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Bundy. "The subject of killing Castro was raised and immediately dismissed," one source who had seen the minutes was quoted as having said.]

Mr. McCone, who was director of the C.I.A. in late 1961 and 1962, has told reporters in the past that plans were formulated for an assassination attempt, but that they were never approved by anyone in authority and did not go forward.

According to the source who discussed what the Rockefeller commission was told, the agency did not formulate these plans "on its own" but was operating as the result of White House discussions. He declined to comment on whether President Kennedy participated in such discussions.

The details of the reported contingency plan were transmitted by the C.I.A. to the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the 40 Committee, a sub-secret group of policy mak-

ers who approve or disapprove all major covert operations, this source said, but the plan was not approved and did not go forward.

This version of the reported Castro assassination plot differs in emphasis from versions published in several articles by Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist. In those accounts, the C.I.A. recruited Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli, and Mr. Roselli made two attempts on the Cuban Premier's life.

According to the former official, the White House discussions involved "the highest level" of the Administration and would not have been honored otherwise. And he said, it was "handled on the highest level" at the C.I.A.

During this period, Mr. Bundy was the senior adviser for national security at the White House. The operational command for covert operations was held by Richard Bissell until early 1962 and Richard Helms after that.

All these men, with Mr. McCone, have testified before the Rockefeller commission, a blue-ribbon panel appointed by President Ford to investigate possible illegal domestic operations of the C.I.A. Mr. Ford later expanded the role of the commission to include an inquiry into alleged plots to kill foreign leaders.

One source said that several of these men had given the commission details confirming that a plan to kill Mr. Castro had been drawn up. What appears to be uncertain to the commission is who in the Kennedy Administration authorized such a plan to be devised.

Earlier today, Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, warned that Congress might pass a law to bar future assassination plots against foreign leaders even if they were ordered by a President.

Mr. Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said: "My own personal view is that it is simply intolerable that any agency of the Government of the United States may engage in murder."

## Demands Ban in Law

"Therefore, if the facts were to lead the committee to conclude that there had been activity of this kind, we will not leave it to executive decision, but we will insist that the laws be so written that such activity never occurs again."

Las Tuesday, The New York Times reported that the Rockefeller commission had obtained documentary evidence from Justice Department files indicating that the C.I.A. had employed Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli.

David W. Belin, counsel to the commission, declined to comment on that report at the time. Neither he nor commission spokesmen were available for comment today.

20 MAY 1975

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NEW YORK TIMES

# Files Said to Link Mafia To C.I.A. in '61 Castro Plot

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 19—The Rockefeller commission has learned of documents supporting the charge that the Central Intelligence Agency contracted with the Mafia in a plot in 1961 to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, authoritative sources reported today.

According to these sources, a former top official of the Department of Justice during the Nixon Administration has told the commission in secret testimony that department files contain Federal Bureau of Investigation memorandums that confirm that the C.I.A. was in touch with Sam Giancana, a Chicago rackets chief, and John Roselli, a soldier of fortune with organized crime connections, in a plot to assassinate Mr. Castro.

The existence of the documents is the first public indication that there is written material to support a long-standing allegation that the agency conspired with organized crime figures in such an assassination attempt.

The file, the sources said, has been found and is now in the hands of John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the department's Criminal Division.

Mr. Keeney is expected to transfer the documents to the commission, which is looking into Government intelligence operations. He declined to comment on the matter. David W. Belin, chief counsel to the commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller, also declined to comment. This has been standard practice for the commission.

As early as 1967, Jack Anderson, the syndicated columnist, reported allegations that Robert A. Mahou, a former F.B.I. agent and manager of Las Vegas properties for the billionaire Howard R. Hughes, recruited Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli in a plot to assassinate Mr. Castro.

According to Mr. Anderson's version, Mr. Roselli, with C.I.A. help, organized one attempted assassination of the Cuban leader in which agents were armed with poison capsules supplied by the agency. In another attempt, these reports said, the group tried to infiltrate rifle sharpshooters into Cuba to kill Mr. Castro during a public meeting.

The sources familiar with the existing files said they did not know if the files went into such detail. But they do confirm that both Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli had been working with the C.I.A. at the time, these sources said.

One source said the file contained a memorandum signed by J. Edgar Hoover, the late director of the F.B.I. in which Mr. Hoover discussed whether Mr. Giancana's C.I.A. connections may have protected him from the full weight of a Justice Department prosecution in the mid-nineteen-sixties. Another source said the files showed that Mr. Roselli's relationship with the intelligence agency came up during an investigation of him by the Justice Department.

There is no information available from present sources whether the assassination attempt was approved by President Kennedy or any other high Kennedy Administration official. Two former aides to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General at the time, told the New York Times several months ago that Mr. Kennedy told them about the C.I.A. plotting with racket figures.

## Plot 'Turned Off'

In interviews, Adam Walinsky and Peter Edelman said Mr. Kennedy told them he had found out about the plot and "turned it off."

The alleged assassination plots took place in 1961, according to several sources and press reports.

In the mid-nineteen-sixties both Mr. Giancana and Mr. Roselli were the subjects of organized crime prosecutions by the Justice Department in separate cases. Mr. Giancana was the subject of a big investigation by the United States Attorney for Chicago, then Edward V. Hanrahan, and the field office of the F.B.I.

He was taken before a grand jury in 1961 granted immunity but refused to answer questions. Federal judge ordered Giancana jailed under contempt for the life grand jury. Mr. Giancana 12 months in the Cook jail as a result. He refused to talk.

After his release, Mr. Hoover recommended that grand jury be called and Giancana be given immunity and jailed again if he refused to answer questions. The Justice Department decided otherwise and the prosecution halted. Mr. Giancana moved to Mexico.

According to sources familiar with the content of the files, Mr. Hoover became convinced that Mr. Giancana had received preferential treatment because of his connection with the C.I.A.

Mr. Hoover, these sources said, noted in the memorandums that Attorney General Kennedy had told him that Giancana had cooperated with the C.I.A. and that if the agency put too much pressure on him, greatly he could compromise the agency.

Nevertheless, several sources said the C.I.A. connection was not a factor in the mid-1960s decision to halt the prosecution. William Hundley, a Washington lawyer formerly in charge of the organized crime section at Justice, said the decision not to bring Mr. Giancana before a new grand jury had been made purely because the department felt this would be harassment and would rest on shaky legal ground.

He said that at the time he had no knowledge of Mr. Giancana's reported connections with the C.I.A. and that no one above him in the department had attempted to put pressure on him.

## Roselli Convicted

It was also in the mid-nineteen-sixties that Mr. Roselli came under Justice Department scrutiny. He was convicted of failing to register as an alien and of conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' Friars Club.

Mr. Roselli's lawyers at one point sought to get clemency for the former gambler on the grounds of his cooperation with the intelligence agency. A source said that files within the Justice Department both mentioned the request for clemency and confirmed the relationship between Mr. Roselli and the C.I.A. This source said there was no indication that Mr. Roselli received clemency for his work.

the source asked rhetorically.


Giancana," a source familiar with this scenario said. Organized crime leaders would privately take credit to support this story, it was said.

Top Administration sources have cautioned that it would be very dangerous "to speculate on whether the plot to kill Mr. Castro was ever approved on the White House level of government."

Several witnesses before the Rockefeller commission have said that assassinations plots may have been "discussed" at various levels of government but were not approved. John A. McCone, who was the C.I.A. director during this period, has said that whenever the assassination of Mr. Castro was brought up "it was rejected immediately."

The Rockefeller commission was assigned to investigate reported plots to assassinate foreign leaders after President Ford became concerned about in-

Page 1 of 2



On the job: An Air America cargo plane unloading at an airstrip in Laos, 1961.



Mothballs: Reserve planes at the Intermountain Aviation field in Arizona.

## How the CIA Does

It began as a blend of patriotism and old school spirit. Back in 1961, an Arlington, Va., lawyer named L. Lee Bean was contacted by a former classmate at the University of Virginia. The old chum had an intriguing proposition: would Bean help the U.S. Government set up several companies to do special work in the interest of national security?

With the approval of his partners, Bean agreed. Next he was directed to a prominent Boston lawyer, Paul Hellmuth at the firm of Hale and Dorr, who provided the actual instructions on incorporation and operation. In short order, Bean's firm was a mailing address for two newly minted concerns: Anderson Security Consultants and Zenith Technical Enterprises. Anderson provided security services for various other U.S. firms (destroying classified documents, investigating employees) while Zenith, headquartered in a deserted blimp base on the campus of the University of Miami, conducted a variety of anti-Castro propaganda and paramilitary operations. What both companies had in common—besides Bean—was that they were wholly owned domestic subsidiaries of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Bean's case is just one example of how the CIA over the years built a multimillion-dollar commercial empire of diverse and deftly disguised "proprietary" companies—owned by the agency itself—to help carry out many of its most clandestine operations. In recent years, as embarrassing public-ity about the proprietaries has spread

have become more effective, there has been a drastic cutback in the proprietary network; significantly, NEWSWEEK learned that the CIA's biggest company, the Washington-based Corp., has trimmed 90 per cent of its staff since 1970. But given the CIA's and proclivities, there is no reason the network couldn't expand again if it seemed useful. And in any case, the proprietaries are a fertile field for the multiple investigations of the agency's activities now gaining momentum on Capitol Hill.

### DESCENDANTS OF TIGERS

In their heyday, the agency's proprietaries helped bomb villages in the Congo, fly mercenaries and supplies into Laos and train Tibetan guerrillas for sneak attacks on China. They also published books, broadcast propaganda and provided "cover" for CIA agents in their own news agencies and free-wheeling public-relations firms in the U.S. and around the world. Even with the current cutbacks, a hard core of proprietaries remains—including, NEWSWEEK has learned, a small news service in Europe, a company supplying technical services in the Middle East, and Fairways Corp., a small Washington airline. And agency veterans suggest that the phasing out is a sign that the CIA is shifting to tactics that avoid the long-term costs of large proprietary operations. The recently revealed sub-raising efforts by the mystery ship Glomar Explorer—operated for the CIA by Howard

version and secret propaganda activities. That office quickly attached itself to the recently created Central Intelligence Agency, where it was known officially as the Plans Division and unofficially as the "Department of Dirty Tricks."

Over the next two years, the agency took increasing control of an unusual Far East airline—Civil Air Transport—which had been formed by seasoned veterans of Air Force Gen. Claire Chennault's daredevil Flying Tigers. CAT's risky missions to harass mainland Communists were financed at first by the Chinese Nationalists, then by the American Airdale Corp. Airdale soon metamorphosed—in the corporate records of Delaware—into the Pacific Corp., subsequently revealed as a linchpin of CIA proprietaries.

Soon other proprietaries came under the umbrella of Pacific Corp., including a number of ostensibly independent firms whose role as CIA covers was later blown by a series of journalistic exposés and books such as former agent Philip Agee's "CIA Diary" and "The CIA and the Culture of Intelligence" by John Marks and CIA alumnus Victor Marchetti. Among the first proprietaries:

■ Air America, which grew from CAT's

# Oswald and the KGB

## Soviet Security Vetoed His Return in '63

By Daniel Schorr

Special to The Washington Post

On Feb. 4, 1964, ten weeks after President Kennedy's assassination, Lt. Col. Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko of the KGB (Soviet state security) defected to the United States in Geneva. He said, among other things, that he had handled the file on Lee Harvey Oswald since the ex-Marine's arrival in Moscow in 1959.

Brought to the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency, Nosenko was turned over to the FBI on Feb. 26, 1964, for several days of interrogation about Oswald, who the Warren Commission said acted alone in assassinating Kennedy in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963. The interrogation report—part of the Warren Commission's secret file, but never cited in testimony or in conclusions—has been declassified. This account is taken from Nosenko's interrogation.

Nosenko painted a picture of Soviet security officers so leery of Oswald, who they considered mentally unstable and possibly a "sleeper" American agent, that they tried to get him out of the country and vetoed his return when he applied in Mexico City in September, 1963.

The security officer said that an inspection of the Soviets' file after the Dallas murder started a Kremlin flap that reached as high as Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev when a notation was found indicating that a KGB officer in Minsk, in violation of instructions, might have tried to recruit Oswald before his return to the United States.

According to Nosenko, it was with relief that it was finally concluded that the entry was a self-serving lie by a bureaucrat, who was ignorant of the implications.

Nosenko's offer to testify in secret before the Warren Commission was declined. John McCone, then director of the CIA, told this reporter that his counterintel-

ligence officers suspected Nosenko might be a plant to exonerate the Soviets of conspiracy.

When McCone appeared before the Warren Commission with his deputy, Richard Helms, in June, 1964, they said that there was "no evidence" of a Soviet conspiracy in Kennedy's assassination. But they did not say they might have evidence to the contrary.

Rep. Gerald R. Ford, a member of the Warren Commission, asked, "Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?"

McCone replied, "No, because at the present time we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction."

Today, McCone says that Nosenko's bona fides "subsequently were proven" and that "it is today the position of the CIA that the information given by Nosenko was correct." Within the agency, it is understood, that is still a subject of dispute.

Whether the Nosenko port would have affected the conclusions of the Warren Commission is hard to judge. Some former staff members said the conclusion that there was "no evidence" of a conspiracy might have been more strongly worded.

Not only did Nosenko deny any Soviet conspiracy, but he said he knew of "no Cuban involvement in the assassination."

The account contained in three interrogations of Nosenko by the FBI can be summarized as follows:

As deputy chief of a KGB counterintelligence section dealing with American and British tourists, Nosenko received a report from an Intourist guide, after Oswald's arrival in Moscow, saying Oswald wanted to stay permanently and become a Soviet citizen.

Deciding that Oswald was "of no interest to the KGB" and "somewhat abnormal," Nosenko had the Intourist guide advise Oswald that he would have to leave when his tourist visa expired.

After slashing his wrist in a Moscow hotel, Oswald was taken to a hospital, where an evaluation of "mental instability" was made. Despite Oswald's threat to try suicide again if he had to leave the country, the KGB advised his expulsion, but later learned that some other authority—the foreign ministry or the Red Cross—permitted him to stay in the Soviet Union and sent him to Minsk.

The KGB's file on Oswald was transferred to Minsk with a cover letter containing instructions that the KGB there "take no action concerning Oswald except to 'passively' observe his activities to make sure he was not a United States intelligence agent temporarily dormant."

The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in September, 1963, when Oswald applied for a re-entry visa at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. An exchange of memos between the foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence directorates of the KGB resulted in a decision that Oswald "not be granted permission to return to the Soviet Union."

Two hours after Kennedy's assassination, Nosenko was called into a KGB office and asked about Oswald. He telephoned Minsk for a summary of Oswald's file. The summary contained a notation that the KGB in Minsk had tried to "influence Oswald in the right direction."

That stirred further investigation, and the entire file was flown to Moscow by military plane. Vladimir Semichastny, chairman of the KGB, was obliged to report to the party central committee and to Khrushchev.

The investigation concluded that the KGB "had no personal contact with Oswald and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner." The entry about trying to "influence Oswald" was attributed to the KGB in Minsk, "unaware of the international significance of Oswald's activities . . . reporting their endeavors to influence Oswald as a self-serving effort to impress the KGB center."

Nosenko said "the Oswald affair was a source of great concern for KGB headquarters, where a large staff was assembled and records were reviewed "to make certain that the KGB had not utilized Oswald as an agent."

Schorr is a CBS News Correspondent.

STAT

# Kissinger Denies Involvement In Domestic Spying by C.I.A.

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5—Secretary of State Kissinger said today that he and the National Security Council had had no involvement in any domestic operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and that he had never "transmitted" to the agency any feeling of concern about domestic security on the part of President Nixon.

His statement was made to reporters after he testified before the Rockefeller Commission, which is investigating the C.I.A.

Richard Helms, former director of Central Intelligence had said in January that domestic operations were conducted in response to Presidential concern that foreign influences were controlling the domestic antiwar movement.

Mr. Kissinger's statement raised the question of whether the C.I.A.'s operations were outside the chain of command suggested by the National Security Act of 1947, which calls upon the C.I.A. to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

The present C.I.A. chief, William E. Colby, said in January that the agency conducted domestic intelligence gathering

from 1970 until 1973 as an outgrowth of Presidential concern over radical activities.

This concern was expressed in the so-called Tuston plan, a proposed attack on radical movement that included burglaries, electronic surveillance and mail covers, which was prepared in 1970 but not implemented. The C.I.A., Mr. Colby has said, continued to gather information and maintain files on Americans even though the plan was not adopted.

The National Security Council, a national security advisory body, and the 40 committees are the normal conduits for commands to C.I.A. for instance, covert activity abroad is conducted either with the express approval of the 40 Committee or under the power of executive orders issued through the council. (The 40 Committee includes representatives from the major agencies of the intelligence community, Mr. Kissinger and members of the council.)

But today, under questioning, Mr. Kissinger said that "since I have been in Washington, the National Security Council or the National Security Council staff or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs did not concern themselves with domestic intelligence or were not informed about domestic intelligence."

Mr. Kissinger has directed the council since 1969 and his tenure covered the years 1970 until 1973, during which Mr. Colby said that part of the domestic intelligence operation took place.

Vice President Rockefeller said today that there were other channels of command between the White House and the C.I.A.

outside of the National Security Council and that these channels could have included President Nixon himself.

Mr. Kissinger also disavowed today any knowledge of alleged assassinations by the C.I.A. Each of the day's other witnesses—a former C.I.A. chief, John A. McCone, Secretary of Defense James M. Schlesinger, and a former White House aide, Walt Rostow — were asked about assassinations.

All denied direct knowledge. Mr. McCone said that during his term of office there was "absolutely no assassination plot or authorized assassination plot against Castro by the Cuban Premier, [Fidel Castro] or any other foreign leader."

Today's session was one of the last two in which the commission will hear witnesses. It has begun to prepare its report, which is scheduled to be given to President Ford on June 6.

Mr. Schlesinger said what he recalled, from his internal investigation of C.I.A., indicated that what authorizations came in the summer of 1971 came through "channels other than the N.S.C."

The concern of the Nixon Administration with domestic radicals was synthesized in a plan written by John Charles Huston, then a White House aide, in the summer of 1970. The plan had been contributed to by members of the major intelligence agencies. It would have authorized, with Presidential approval, the use of burglaries, mail covers and electronic surveillance, to gather intelligence about the domestic radical movement.

The plan was in effect for five days, but was rescinded when the late J. Edgar Hoover refused to allow the F.B.I. to be involved. It was not the only period in which the C.I.A. has conducted domestic intelligence, according to Mr. Colby, the agency head.

6 MAY 1975

STAT

## Kissinger denies links to any CIA death plots

Washington (AP) — The Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, yesterday denied having any involvement in alleged Central Intelligence Agency domestic spying or foreign assassination plots.

"Since I have been in Washington, the National Security Council or the National Security Council staff or the assistant to the President for national security affairs did not concern themselves with domestic intelligence or were informed about domestic intelligence," Mr. Kissinger told reporters after a two-hour-closed-door session with the Rockefeller commission.

Asked about allegations of CIA assassination plots, Mr. Kissinger chuckled and said, "None of those allegations pertain to any period of which I have personal knowledge."

The Defense Secretary, James R. Schlesinger, who headed the agency briefly in 1973, also testified and later told reporters that "assassination has not been used as a tool by the CIA at any time."

However, Mr. Schlesinger said he would have "no comment on allegations regarding [the assassination of] foreign leaders" and added that "there are questions here that the commission and the appropriate congressional bodies may wish to review."

Asked whether the CIA had undertaken domestic surveillance in response to White House pressure, Mr. Schlesinger said, "My recollection ... is that indeed there were expressions of interest on the part of senior officials of the government."

Asked if these expressions came from Mr. Kissinger, who ordinarily would direct CIA covert activities, Mr. Schlesinger indicated that the requests for domestic surveillance "came through channels other than national security channels."

Vice President Rockefeller, the commission chairman,

briefing reporters on the day's session, confirmed that "there were many channels from the White House to the CIA" but refused to supply details or state where requests for domestic surveillance had originated.

Walt W. Rostow, Mr. Kissinger's predecessor as national security adviser, also appeared before the commission but declined any comment on his testimony.

John A. McCone, the central intelligence director during the early 1960's, also testified before the eight-member commission investigating allegations of CIA domestic wrongdoing.

Mr. McCone later told reporters he had to "plead ignorance" in response to questions about alleged plots against the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. "During my term of office, there was no, absolutely no assassination plot or authorized assassination plot against Castro or any other foreign leader," Mr. McCone said.

Mr. Kissinger was asked by reporters about the future of a former CIA director, Richard M. Helms, now Ambassador to Iran. "Helms will remain ambassador to Iran," Mr. Kissinger said. "I have complete confidence in him."

Last January, Mr. Helms acknowledged publicly that a special counter-intelligence unit was set up within the CIA in response to presidential concern that domestic unrest was influenced from abroad.

# Schlesinger Reinforces CIA Role as Passive

By Jeremiah O'Leary  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The finality of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's declaration that the CIA has never resorted to assassination could be construed as reinforcing the contention of administration sources that the agency discussed and knew about political murder plots but never was involved in a successful one.

Schlesinger made his statement late yesterday after testifying before the Rockefeller commission investigating illegal domestic activities of the CIA.

He emerged from his closed-door appearance and, unlike some former CIA officials, appeared almost eager to set the record straight. He said, "Let me make it very clear now that assassination has not been

## Analysis

used as a tool by the CIA at any time, and I don't think that applies prospectively any more than it does retrospectively."

**THE FORMER CIA** director was even more emphatic in denying CIA involvement in the slaying of President John F. Kennedy.

"The suggestion of any CIA involvement is preposterous," Schlesinger said. "It is psychologically and intellectually impossible that the CIA could in any way be involved in the tragic event."

He said any such suggestions could only emanate from sick imaginations. The agency's whole role, he said, has been to serve and protect the United States and its leaders.

Schlesinger refused to comment directly on reports of CIA involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders, but he said appropriate review bodies such as the Rockefeller commission and the congressional committees will want to review those issues.

**THE SUM** of Schlesinger's declarations are strongly supportive of statements to The Star by White House and CIA officials that the agency knew of, and even discussed, political murder but never was involved in a successful one.

This leaves open the implication that the CIA may have had direct involvement in plots for political murder that did not succeed — for example, perhaps plots against Fidel Castro, whose death was certainly desired by many Cubans. It is even more suggestive that the CIA knew of such plots but was not directly involved.

Commission officials said yesterday that the group, appointed by President Ford and headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, is nearing the end of the labors it began last February. The hearings will be completed Monday, and then the commission will begin writing its report and recommendations for the President.

**THE REPORT** is to be handed to Ford on June 4 and will be released publicly soon after that. At that stage, the Senate Intelligence Committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, will commence its hearings into the activities of all American intelligence agencies. Its House counterpart is almost totally dormant.

Also testifying yesterday was Henry A. Kissinger. He

denied having any knowledge or involvement in either alleged CIA domestic spying or foreign assassination plots.

"Since I have been in Washington, the National Security Council or the NSC staff, or the assistant to the president for national security affairs (Kissinger's other title) did not concern themselves with domestic intelligence; nor were they informed about domestic intelligence," Kissinger declared.


Asked about allegations of CIA assassination plots, Kissinger said none of those allegations pertain to the period of his service in Washington from 1963 until the present.

**ANOTHER WITNESS** yesterday, former CIA Director John A. McCone (1961-1965) said, "During my term of office, there was no, absolutely no assassination plot against Castro or any other foreign leader."

McCone said such plots were not consistent with the moral values of the United States or the CIA.



## VIEW FROM THE TOP



### TO OWN THEM IS TO KNOW THEM— NELSON ROCKEFELLER ON THE CIA

When Gerald Ford chose Nelson Rockefeller to be his vice president, he was quick to point out that his nominee would come in handy. Rockefeller, Ford assured the evening news, was a man of many talents. The president told no lies. Nelson Rockefeller comes in handy just about anywhere he's used.

Less than a month after his confirmation the new vice president found a ready outlet for his skills. The Central Intelligence Agency was accused of spying stateside, and Rockefeller was called upon to head the Blue Ribbon Commission to Investigate the CIA. Ford was sure that Rockefeller was just the man to sort the charges out. A few folks have cried foul, pointing to the former New York governor's five-year stint on the committee that oversees the agency he is now to investigate. But Rockefeller views his appointment differently. His prior job was, he explained, all part of his "working knowledge of intelligence," and a central resource for a man conducting investigations such as the Blue Ribbon Commission. That kind of working knowledge shouldn't be squandered.

If it weren't for his family's business, Nelson Rockefeller might not know nearly as much about intelligence as he does. The Rockefellers' business is money—its management and its accumulation. In three generations the family has bought control of 250 billion dollars worth of corporations. It has also cornered one-half of the total of American private investments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Inevitably, the CIA and the family business crossed paths early in the agency's career.

Allen Dulles was appointed director of the CIA in 1953—he came to government service straight from a job as a Rockefeller lawyer. That same year, the CIA, worried that the ex-

isting Iranian government might nationalize foreign investments, engineered a coup and replaced the premier with a former Nazi. Shortly thereafter, Standard Oil, the foundation of the Rockefellers' family business, began to tap Iranian oil reserves. In 1961, the same script was acted out in the Congo—Patrice Lumumba, that country's premier, was murdered by his own army and replaced by a soldier named Mobutu. In the aftermath of the Congolese revolution, David Rockefeller, chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank and Nelson's brother, led an expedition of businessmen into Mobutu-land to explore the "investment climate." It must have been good. Using Rockefeller financing, Pan Am acquired the local airline, AT&T built a subsidiary, Esso drilled for oil, and Standard of Indiana went into the copper business.

The next CIA director, John McCone, took over the reins of intelligence after working as a Standard Oil attorney. Following McCone's appointment the familiar pattern of CIA intervention in foreign governments recurred. Salvador Allende, the first Communist president in Chile's history, was overthrown by a CIA-financed coup in 1973. The year before, Allende had expropriated the Anaconda copper mines, an important wing of the Rockefellers' family business. Henry Kissinger—chairman of the security council that approved, and may even have ordered, CIA intervention in Chile—is a longtime Rockefeller family employee.

With a background like that, Nelson Rockefeller is establishing a whole new level of expertise in government service. He is also insuring himself of a lot of work in the future. It will be nearly impossible to convene any more commissions without calling on Nelson Rockefeller's mass of "working knowledge."

The commission on high interest rates will certainly need the counsel of a man whose

family controls 20 percent of the banks in the United States. It would be foolish to pass over his experience. And the commission on gas prices is a natural, too. The Rockefeller family has controlling interests in Standard, Mobil, Amoco, Arco, Esso, American, Citgo, Exxon, and Humble oil companies.

If Gerald Ford decides to take on the insurance companies, we can all rest easy knowing he has expert help. The Rockefellers have their hands on one-quarter of all the life insurance sold in this country.

After that we can look forward to the Blue Ribbon Commission on Consumer Prices. With Nelson Rockefeller in the administration, Gerald Ford has the inside track here as well. The vice president is one of the owners of Mazola Corn Oil, Karo Syrup, Kleenex, Nucco Margarine, Kotex Sanitary Napkins, Skippy Peanut Butter, Best Food Mayonnaise, Orange Crush, and the American Sugar Company.

It's hard to imagine that the commission on corporate taxation would get far without the man whose company, Standard Oil of Ohio, earned \$66 million last year and paid no taxes. Or that the commission on the distribution of wealth would be complete without the leadership of a man whose family's personal fortune is larger than the total worth of 100 million Americans. And just think how useful the vice president could be to the commission on urban renewal and safer neighborhoods. The Rockefeller Pocantico Hills estate, which is staffed by five hundred servants and protected by thirty-five armed guards, covers five square miles and is surrounded by electric barbed wire. Living like that must have taught Nelson Rockefeller a lot. It's a shame not to put his knowledge to good use.

Gerald Ford made a shrewd appointment: whatever the subject, Nelson Rockefeller knows it like he owns it.—David Harris

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# Soviet Plan to Kill Nixon Reported

By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

The Soviet secret police had a contingency plan to kill Richard Nixon if he had been elected President in 1960, a high Soviet intelligence officer has told the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Nixon murder plot was described to incredulous CIA agents by Anatol Golytsyn, a former KGB major, who defected to the United States from his post in Helsinki, Finland, in the early 1960s.

He gave American agents other valuable intelligence, which has turned out to be accurate. Our sources, therefore, believe his story about the Nixon assassination plan.

Golytsyn's view was that the plan, although bizarre, was deadly serious. He attributed it to the late Nikita Khrushchev, then commanding the Kremlin, whom Golytsyn understood to be somewhat deranged. In those days, Nixon had the reputation as an implacable foe of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet major also told CIA agents that the hot-tempered Khrushchev had talked about eliminating the brilliant ballet dancer, Rudolf Nureyev,

after he defected to the West. The worried Golytsyn tried to warn Nureyev of the possibility, according to our sources, although they don't know whether the warning ever reached Nureyev.

For years, Golytsyn's spectacular revelations have been hidden in the CIA's files. But after stories about the CIA's assassination attempts hit the headlines, CIA sources confided Golytsyn's KGB assassination tales to us.

The former KGB officer was one of the highest ranking Soviet defectors in CIA history. The United States paid him \$200,000 in compensation and spent at least \$500,000 more to protect him, our sources say. Part of the money was spent on an ingenious scheme to sneak him and his family into the United States.

By comparison, a far more publicized defector, Peter Deriabin, was paid only \$25,000. Our sources agree, however, that the taxpayers got their money's worth from Golytsyn.

During 18 months of debriefing, Golytsyn blew the cover on one dangerous Communist spy operation after another. Our sources say he helped identify members of the notorious "Sap-

phire" Soviet ring, which became the model, in part, for the novel and movie "Topaz."

Britain's Kim Philby and Sweden's Stig Eric Wennerstrom, two of the most celebrated Soviet international agents, were exposed with the help of Golytsyn, as well as lesser spies in Germany, France and NATO.

In time, the strong-willed Golytsyn tired of CIA surveillance and decided to take his complaints to the late Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General. The defector was housed within walking distance of Kennedy's home in Northern Virginia and visited with him either at his home or in another private place, our sources recall.

Golytsyn also drafted a long letter laying out his problems to Kennedy and expressed his pique to John McCone, then the CIA head. This upset the CIA agents who had gone to such lengths to protect him as renting cars to visit him so the tag numbers couldn't be traced back to "security" cars.

Our sources say he was last reported living in the United States under a superbly corived false identity.

Footnote: When a forest fire was reported near Nixon's Cali-

fornia residence in the 1960s, CIA agents close to Golytsyn thought at first that the KGB might have caused it. A CIA spokesman had no comment on Golytsyn's disclosures.

Shan Connection—The colorful Shan guerrillas have made another signed, secret offer to sell most of the Southeast Asian opium crop to the U.S. government at the prevailing black market price. The sale would dry up 20 per cent of the heroin supply now reaching the United States.

The Shan hillmen are willing to back up their offer, moreover, by attacking any other convoys that try to bring opium out of the back country.

The offer has been relayed to Washington through Rep. Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), chairman of a House narcotics subcommittee and the House's leading expert on Burma-Thai-Laos opium production.

It has been submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a secret subcommittee report, signed by Wolff, Rep. Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.) and Rep. J. Herbert Burke (R-Fla.).

A similar offer was rejected by the U.S. government in August, 1973.

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# Climate of suspicion

# The Oswald-CIA link won't connect

By Jim Squires

WASHINGTON—A prominent Midwestern governor, respected for his intelligence and rational judgment privately expressed concern recently that investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency might uncover, among other things, agency links to the assassinations of the Kennedys, Martin Luther King, and the shooting of George Wallace.

"Do you really believe that?" reporters asked incredulously.

"No," the governor replied, "but I no longer consider it beyond the realm of possibility."

WHILE GOVERNORS are not necessarily more stable than anyone else, they generally should have more faith in the system and be less suspicious of grand conspiracies. But it may be that the mind-shattering experience of Watergate has propelled all Americans to a new threshold of insecurity about their government.

Perhaps the trail of punctured balloons, broken pedestals, and fallen heroes has left us as skeptical as Europeans, who generally tend to disbelieve their government's official pronouncements.

We now read daily what we only suspected in the past: that Presidents lie, that J. Edgar Hoover was not a saint; that the Central Intelligence Agency won't even bother to deny it was involved in political assassinations abroad.

In such an atmosphere it is only natural that old questions about the nation's most infamous crimes—political murders at home—are again being raised.

Conspiracy theories surrounding the deaths of John and Robert Kennedy, King, and the attempted assassination of Wallace never died, even though in more recent years the debate has been limited to conspiracy freaks and amateur sleuths.

Haunting, unanswered questions still linger around all four cases. But the most fertile ground for conspiracy breeding is the first—the murder of the President in Dallas in 1963.

WITHIN THE MONTH, another new book on a worn topic has appeared, alleging that voice-stress evaluation tests prove that Lee Harvey Oswald was not Kennedy's assassin.

A skeptic of some stature, former Democratic Sen. Ralph Yarborough of Texas has called for the reopening of the Warren Commission investigation. And, almost casually, the Rockefeller Commission investigating the CIA has confirmed that it is indeed examining possible links between the agency and Oswald.

Because Oswald once defected to the Soviet Union and then returned to the United States, it was quickly and widely assumed that such a relationship existed. But on May 18, 1964, CIA Director John McCone swore before the Warren Commission that the agency had never communicated, directly or indirectly, with Oswald; that he was not an agent, employee, or informant and the agency was never connected with him "in any way whatsoever."

In 1964, a sworn declaration by such a high-ranking government official was enough. In 1975, it is not. And now amateur sleuths, professional sleuths, and journalists are plowing thru a lot of dusty information in search of new clues that might link Oswald to the nation's intelligence apparatus.

WHAT THEY WILL find is fascinating.

Oswald's potential for contact with the CIA is great. But the actual connections, if any at all, appear restricted to rather tenuous relationships with three individuals, during his lifetime all of whom are suspected of having had ties to the CIA.

The first is Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who was a target of District Atty. Jim Garrison's discredited assassination investigation. While Shaw had all the earmarks of a CIA operator, Garrison, for all his efforts, never proved a single link between Shaw and Oswald.

The best anyone can do in that regard is that Oswald once passed out pro-Castro leaflets in a building owned by Shaw. And that the well-traveled Shaw, in his role as international trader, most likely passed information to the CIA at one time or another.

The second relationship is hardly more fruitful. Oswald considered as his best friend a man named George de Mohrenschildt, a Russian-born petroleum engineer who came to the United States in 1933. He and his wife knew the Oswalds when they lived in Dallas.

The Warren Commission concluded that de Mohrenschildt had no connection with the assassination. But it did not make the same claim about his relationship with the CIA.

IT SEEMS THAT de Mohrenschildt and his wife took an eight-month hiking tour from the U. S.-Mexican border to Panama in 1960 and were in Guatemala when the CIA launched part of its ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion from there. The Warren report said de Mohrenschildt later turned over films and a full account of his travels "to the U. S. government."

This fact alone has led many conspiracy buffs to conclude that de Mohrenschildt was at least an informer for the CIA and undoubtedly had told the agency of his friend Oswald, who was already prominent in the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Researchers who suspect de Mohrenschildt of CIA contact are far more certain of a third man who was in a position to cross paths with Oswald—Guy W. Banister of New Orleans. The question is whether he ever did.

In August, 1963, Oswald was arrested in New Orleans following a fracas with anti-Castro Cubans upset by his distribution of pro-Castro leaflets. Oswald's leaflets bore the address of 544 Camp St., an office he apparently never occupied.

The office at 544 Camp St. had been used, however, as the headquarters for an anti-Castro organization known as the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front, which was widely rumored to be a CIA-funded operation.

IT WAS ADJACENT to a second office [fronting at 531 Lafayette St. around the corner] occupied by Banister, a former Chicago FBI agent, and an ex-deputy New Orleans police commissioner who doubled as a private detective and government contact with the community of Cuban revolutionaries in New Orleans.

More than one witness remembers seeing boxes of rifles, ammunition, and grenades in Banister's office. Although their credibility is not unchallenged, they all profess a common belief: Banister was a CIA or military intelligence contact with a contingent of Cubans being trained for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

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continued

# Hill Panel Asks Ford for CIA Report

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By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Operations voted yesterday to ask President Ford for the Central Intelligence Agency's top-secret report to him on allegations of illegal CIA domestic activities.

Committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) indicated after a closed, 90-minute meeting that the committee had decided to ask Mr. Ford at the same time for copies of any executive orders and National Security Council directives assigning various tasks to the CIA and other government intelligence agencies.

Church declined to say whether he expected any claims of executive privilege.

"I'd rather wait and let the White House make the next move," he said. "The ball is now in that court."

The 11-member committee voted unanimously to request the documents. Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the vice chairman, said he thought the President would "bend every effort to cooperate with us" and thus avoid a protracted investigation.

The committee also made public an exchange of correspondence with CIA Director William E. Colby that suggests some intricate negotiations may be necessary as the Senate's CIA investigation moves forward.

In a letter to Church dated March 11, Colby formally agreed to let CIA employees discuss classified information with Senate investigators, but

not what he described as "particularly sensitive matters."

For these, Colby said, "different procedures are obviously necessary." In such instances, the CIA director said agency employees would first propose ways of responding to the committee without exposing "sensitive details." If the committee insists on disclosure, Colby said he was prepared to negotiate with it over "the appropriate course of action to be taken."

Elaborating on what he regarded as "particularly sensitive," Colby set down a wide range of categories, including:

- "The identities of our sensitive sources."

- "The material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services."

- "The details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods."

- "The identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnaping or assassination."

- "The identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence."

- "Some additional materials, the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign or national security problems."

Finally, Colby wrote Church, "we should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals."

Speaking with reporters before the correspondence was handed out, Church voiced no

objections to the arrangement, but it was not clear whether he and the CIA director were speaking on the same wavelength. In a March 12 reply to Colby, Church

replied that he agreed to join discussions wherever the inquiry touches on sensitive matters, but the senator defined this, only in terms of "the identity of CIA personnel, sources, of cooperating organizations whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy."

Following yesterday's session, Tower also announced appointment of the committee's minority counsel, Alexandria lawyer Curtis R. Smith, 31, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and once the Army's youngest full-time military trial judge.

Church said he expected the committee staff to begin interviewing witnesses shortly, but estimated it would be two to three months before any public hearings could begin. The inquiry, which will also cover the FBI and other government intelligence agencies, will be undertaken, at least at the outset, by four staff task forces. They will explore foreign intelligence operations, domestic intelligence operations, the "executive command structure" for the government's intelligence community, and the military intelligence agencies.

## Ex-CIA Chief Denies Assassination Plots

Associated Press

Former CIA Director John A. McCone yesterday denied any knowledge of an attempt to assassinate Cuban

Premier Fidel Castro or any other foreign official.

"To my knowledge there's nothing that was brought to my attention that involves any attempt against Castro or any other person during my tenure of office," McCone said in a telephone interview. "I had frequent meetings with the President and Robert Kennedy and with others who were concerned about Cuba and . . . at no time at any of those meetings was any mention made of the assassination of Castro."

McCone headed the agency from 1961 to 1965, under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Robert F. Kennedy was Attorney General during his brother's administration, and during Johnson's first months in office.

Time magazine this week cited "credible sources" as saying the CIA enlisted "U.S. Mafia figures in several unsuccessful attempts to kill Castro" both before and shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

Two former aides to Robert Kennedy, Adam Wabnitz and Peter B. Edelstein, have said Kennedy told them he once learned of and stopped a CIA effort to use the Mafia to kill Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs.

McCone said he had developed a very close relationship with Robert Kennedy and "it would have been the most natural thing in the world" for the Attorney General to tell him of the incident.

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# McCone Denies Part In Any CIA Kill Plots

By JOSEPH VOLZ

Washington, March 12 (News Bureau) — John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, denied today any knowledge of alleged CIA plots to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro or other foreign leaders.

"To my knowledge there's nothing that was brought to my attention that involves any attempt against Castro or any other person during my tenure of office," McCone said in an Associated Press interview. "I had frequent meetings with the President and Robert Kennedy and with others who were concerned about Cuba and . . . at no time at any of those meetings was any mention made of the assassination of Castro."

McCone a Los Angeles industrialist, was named to head the CIA after the Bay of Pigs attack in 1961, replacing the late Allen W. Dulles, who was eased out by President John F. Kennedy. McCone continued to head the CIA during the early years of the Johnson administration, leaving in 1965. Robert Kennedy was attorney general during his brother's

administration and for a year under Johnson.

Two of Robert Kennedy's former aides, Adam Walinsky and Peter B. Edelman, have said that Kennedy told them he once learned of, and stopped, a CIA effort to use the Mafia to kill Castro before the Bay of Pigs attack.

But McCone, who insisted "It would have been the most natural thing in the world" for Robert Kennedy to have told him of such an incident, said that Kennedy never mentioned anything to him about it.

He said he was basing his comments on his own recollections and on a search of his files that he ordered following news reports of a CIA-Mafia link.

McCone attributed the news reports of CIA involvement in assassinations to disgruntled former employer of the agency.

## Senate Unit Seeks 'Vail Report' on C.I.A. Role in

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 12—

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities voted unanimously today to ask President Ford for the Central Intelligence Agency's written report on its domestic activities.

The vote, which had been expected, concerned a report Mr. Ford received while on a Colorado skiing vacation late last year from William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence.

The report has thus far been furnished by the President only to the commission on the C.I.A.'s domestic intelligence activities headed by Vice President Rockefeller, and not to any Congressional bodies.

Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, the chairman of the select committee, said, following a two-hour closed session in which the vote was taken, "that a letter would be sent to the White House today containing a formal request for the document that Mr. Colby placed in the President's hands."

The "Vail Report," as it has become known after the ski resort where Mr. Ford and Mr. Colby met, is believed to be about 50 pages in length and

to concern itself with the agency's domestic activities, some of which Mr. Colby has termed of "questionable" legality.

Some details of the agency's domestic activities, including the wiretapping of United States citizens, were contained in testimony subsequently supplied by Mr. Colby to the Senate and House Appropriations committees, and made public.

But Mr. Colby told a House subcommittee last week that he had discovered other "questionable" undertakings that so far had not been publicly disclosed, but which presumably were included in the "Vail report."

**'Oral Addendum'**

There have been reports that Mr. Colby also supplied the President with an "oral addendum" to the report that touched on the intelligence agency's activities abroad and included references to possible C.I.A. involvement in schemes to assassinate foreign leaders.

Asked whether the select committee would also seek to learn the contents of any oral statement given Mr. Ford, Senator Church replied that, although today's letter related only to the written report, "We expect to get all of the information."

Mr. Church added that while the question of assassinations was not raised at today's meeting of the committee, "we naturally want to get to the bottom of any charges relating to assassinations, and in due course we will be looking into those charges very thoroughly."

**Plots Mentioned**

A number of published and broadcast reports in recent days have quoted unnamed sources and former Government officials in referring to plots by the agency against as many as seven foreign leaders.

The New York Times reported on Monday that Adam Walinsky and Peter B. Edelman, two former aides to the late Robert F. Kennedy, stated that Mr. Kennedy had told them that C.I.A. agents had contracted with the Mafia in an abortive attempt to murder Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba.

Mr. Church told reporters today that he had "no information" about that report or about any others, and that he "would rather refrain from commenting on anything as inflammatory as alleged assassinations."

However, John A. McCone, who headed the intelligence agency between 1961 and 1965

under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, was quoted in an interview with The Associated Press today as saying that he had no knowledge of assassination plots "that involved Castro or any other person during my tenure of office."

"At no time were any such plans of either a contractual arrangement with the Mafia [or] to assassinate Castro ever discussed with me," Mr. McCone said, and he attributed the reports to bitter former employees of the agency.

**Had Issued Waiver**

Mr. Church today also released a letter in which Mr. Colby disclosed his intention that any discussion of certain "sensitive matters" before the select committee by C.I.A. employees would be subject to the agency's prior approval.

Mr. Colby had previously issued, with respect to the panel's investigation, a waiver of the agency's "contract agreement," a signed pledge in which each of its employees promises never to disclose any classified information gained during the course of employment. Mr. Church, at the time, applauded the waiver as a hopeful sign of the agency's willingness to cooperate fully.

# Former CIA head says he knows nothing of a bid to kill Castro

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Washington (AP)—John A. McCone, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, flatly denied yesterday any knowledge of an agency plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro or any other foreign official.

"To my knowledge there's nothing that was brought to my attention that involves any attempt against Castro or any other person during my tenure of office," Mr. McCone said in a telephone interview. "I had frequent meetings with the President and Robert Kennedy and with others who were concerned about Cuba and . . . at no time at any of those meetings was any mention made of the assassination of Castro."

Mr. McCone headed the agency from 1961 to 1965 under the late Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Robert F. Kennedy was

attorney general during his brother's administration and the beginning of the Johnson administration.

Time magazine this week cited "credible sources" as saying that "the CIA enlisted the expert hired-gun help of U.S. Mafia figures in several unsuccessful attempts to kill Castro both before and shortly after the CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961."

Two former aides to Robert Kennedy, Adam Walinsky and Peter B. Edelman, have said that the late senator told them he once learned of and stopped a CIA effort to use the Mafia to kill Premier Castro before the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. McCone, who took over the agency following the Bay of Pigs disaster, said he developed a very close relationship with Robert Kennedy while serving as CIA director and "it

would have been the most natural thing in the world" for the then-attorney general to tell him of the incident.

"He never said that, and he would have," Mr. McCone said.

The former intelligence chief said he was basing his comments both on his own recollection and on a search of his files.

"At no time was any such plan of either a contractual arrangement with the Mafia or any arrangement with the Mafia or any other organization to assassinate Castro ever discussed with me," Mr. McCone said, adding that he thought it was unlikely that such a plot could have existed without his knowledge.

Mr. McCone attributed the news reports of CIA involvement in assassinations to bitter

former employees of the agency.

## Senators seek report

Washington (AP)—The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted unanimously yesterday to ask President Ford to turn over a secret report presented to the White House by William E. Colby, director of

the Central Intelligence Agency, in response to charges of illegal domestic spying.

The request, in the form of a letter sent to Mr. Ford, does not include a demand for information contained in an additional verbal report Mr. Colby reportedly gave the President about alleged CIA involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders.

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# McCone Denies Knowing Of CIA Plot to Kill Castro

By David C. Martin  
Associated Press

Former CIA director John A. McCone has flatly denied knowledge of any agency plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro or any other foreign official.

"To my knowledge there's nothing that was brought to my attention that involves any attempt against Castro or any other person during my tenure of office," he said yesterday in a telephone interview.

"I had frequent meetings with the President and Robert Kennedy and with others who were concerned about Cuba and ... at no time at any of those meetings was any mention made of the assassination of Castro."

He headed the agency from 1961 to 1965 under the late Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Robert F. Kennedy was attorney general during his brother's administration and during the early Johnson years.

**TIME MAGAZINE** this week cited "credible sources" as saying "the CIA enlisted the expert hired-gun help of U.S. Mafia figures in several unsuccessful attempts to kill Castro both before and shortly after the CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961."

Two former aides to Robert Kennedy, Adam Walinsky and Peter B. Edelman, have said he told them he learned of and stopped a CIA effort to use the Mafia to kill Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs.

McCone, who took over the agency following the Bay of Pigs, said he developed a close relationship



**JOHN MCCONE**  
Denies involvement

with Robert Kennedy while CIA director and that "it would have been the most natural thing in the world" for Kennedy to have told him of the incident

**MCCONE** said he based his comments on his own recollection and on a search of his files made after news reports linking the CIA and the Mafia to assassination plots against Castro. He attributed reports of CIA involvement to bitter ex-employees of the agency.

Walinsky and Edelman said Kennedy told them in 1967 that while chief counsel to a Senate committee investigating organized crime in the late 1950s, he learned of the plot in questioning a Las Vegas mobster.

"It was unclear whether the arrangement had been made by someone associated with the agency or whether there was any official sanction within the

agency," Edelman said. Walinsky said Kennedy had received "assurances in writing" from the CIA that the plot had been aborted.

**BUT** Kenneth O'Donnell, who was assistant chief counsel to the committee and later White House chief of staff, said he never heard any mention of a plot to kill Castro. And Carmine Bellino, a chief investigator for the rackets committee who said he was present during all Kennedy's interviews with gangland figures, said he could not recall mention of such a plot.

"Bobby had no secrets from me," O'Donnell said of his years on the rackets committee. "I lived in his house for two years" and "there wasn't a memo that went through the committee that I didn't see."

"My knowledge is first hand," O'Donnell said, "and I would like to think that ... you're going to consider what I say as opposed to Walinsky and Edelman."

**HOWEVER**, he added: "To say that somebody in the CIA didn't give somebody fifty bucks and say here go knock off (Dominican Republic dictator Rafael) Trujillo, that I can't do."

The late Allen Dulles headed the CIA at the time Kennedy was chief counsel to the Senate committee. His top aide, Richard Bissell, said he never discussed a Castro assassination plot with Kennedy and that it was "inherently unlikely" that the agency, then under the control of a Republican administration, would provide written assurances to a Democratically controlled committee that such a plot had been aborted.



# HLESINGER SEES EW C.I.A. LAPSES

Is Ford Panel the Number  
'Misdemeanors' in Last  
20 Years Is 'Quite Small'

By LINDA CHARLTON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13—The presidential commission investigating alleged domestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency held its first meeting today and was told by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, a former C.I.A. director, at the number of "misdemeanors" by the agency was quite small.

Mr. Schlesinger, one of three C.I.A. officials who appeared before the eight-member commission, told reporters as he left the meeting that "certain things did come to light" in the review of the agency's intelligence activities that had been precipitated by the discovery of the agency's involvement in the Watergate affair.

## 20-Year Period Cited

But, he added, "Over all, one must recognize that these bear on the entire history of the Central Intelligence Agency over a period in excess of 20 years, and one must recognize that the number of misdemeanors in that period is, I think, quite small."

Mr. Schlesinger's remarks constituted his first public acknowledgement of a basis for the allegations about illegal domestic activities by the agency that he headed for about six months in 1973.

Vice President Rockefeller, who heads the commission, said at a news briefing in the late afternoon that Mr. Schlesinger "made exactly that same statement" to the commission, but would give no details of this or anything else heard or discussed at the day-long meeting, which continued until just past 6 P.M.

Secretary Schlesinger, whose

Members of the panel investigating the C.I.A., from the left: Vice President Rockefeller, chairman; Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, C. Douglas Dillon, John T.

Connor, Erwin N. Griswold, Lane Kirkland and Edgar Shannon Jr. Behind Mr. Shannon is a newsman. Member of the panel held a meeting yesterday in Washington.

words were at variance with what was reliably reported to be his extreme concern and distress on hearing of the agency's alleged domestic spying, was one of two former C.I.A. directors to appear. He was followed by Richard Helms, who preceded Mr. Schlesinger as Director of Central Intelligence.

William E. Colby, the present director, who succeeded Mr. Schlesinger in September, 1973, was the first to go into the conference room, entering with an attaché case and bulging note book at 11:20 A.M. and leaving about 4:30. He made no public statement.

Mr. Rockefeller and the seven other members of the commission appointed by President Ford were sworn in by Carrie L. Gooding, a General Services Administration personnel officer, in Mr. Rockefeller's cream-and-blue office about 10:30 A.M. The panel members then walked through a small anteroom to the adjoining conference room, where they sat around a boat-shaped table.

Mr. Rockefeller, in a brief statement, said that the commission had "but one objective: We are going to get to the bottom of this problem."

"We are going to conduct this inquiry with determination and with thoroughness, and we are going to get all of the facts," he said. "We can have, and we must have, an intelligence capability—which is essential to our security as a nation—without offending our liberties as a people."

None of the three men who appeared today were sworn, but each signed a waiver allowing his words to be used by the commission. The nameplate in front of the seat reserved for witnesses said only: "Visitor."

David Belin, the 46-year-old Des Moines, Iowa, lawyer whose appointment as executive director of the commission will be announced by the White House Wednesday, sat in on the opening portion of the meeting and met after the session with Mr. Rockefeller.

He was not able to stay throughout the day, according to Mr. Rockefeller's press secretary, Hugh Morrow, because his security clearance has not been completed.

Mr. Belin, who served as counsel to the Warren Commission, which, in 1964, investigated the assassination of President Kennedy, will have a staff of at least seven investigators. The only money at the staff's disposal at present, Mr. Morrow said, is \$150,000 from Presidential contingency funds.

## 'A Lengthy Report'

Mr. Rockefeller, at a news briefing at 4:45 P.M., said that Mr. Colby had "made a lengthy report during which questions were asked." He was followed by Mr. Schlesinger, and "again questions were asked."

The Vice President said that he thought the panel's investigation would "probably consume a large part if not all of the three months" that the President had allotted for its work.

He said that Mr. Colby had indicated his willingness to have the commission talk with present and former C.I.A. em-

ployes. In response to a question, he said that there were "no restrictions on who we will call."

However, in response to another question—as to whether he could call upon past C.I.A. employees to come forward with information about the agency's domestic activities—he said that "to go out with a dragnet" would strain the resources of the committee's "very small staff and very small time."

Pressed as to whether the panel intended to hear not only from top officials of the agency but also from "the ranks," he said, "We will go down into the ranks."

Less than an hour later, the commission's staff issued a statement saying that Mr. Rockefeller had taken up that question with other commissioners and added:

"The commission response was that it would welcome any specific, factual information from individuals, especially former or present members of the C.I.A., relating to domestic activities of the C.I.A."

At his news briefing, Mr. Rockefeller was also asked if the committee would make its report public. He replied, "I would think that would be the case." He added, however, that he was not making a commitment.

He said that he was "not going to go into the detailed

Continued



# Caucus votes spy probe

## Democrats in Senate set CIA, FBI quiz

By MURIEL DOBBIN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — The Senate Democratic caucus yesterday voted overwhelmingly to set up a special committee responsible for investigating alleged misconduct on the part of the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI.

The 45-to-7 vote, taken after a three-hour meeting, was a defeat for Senator John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose voice was heard through the closed door of the caucus room vigorously opposing the proposed congressional probe into the operations of intelligence gathering agencies.

### No "massive" spying

Meantime, Vice President Rockefeller, chairman of an eight-member presidential commission set up to study CIA activities, said initial inquiries did not support charges of "massive" domestic spying.

However, he said he was certain the special commission would make recommendations designed to close any loopholes relating to domestic surveillance in the intelligence agency's charter.

The Rockefeller commission heard testimony in private session from Richard M. Helms and John A. McCone, both former directors of the CIA. Mr. Helms told newsmen that he acknowledged concern on the part of both the late President Johnson and former President Nixon regarding antiwar demonstrations. He did not answer a question as to whether that concern had led the CIA into domestic spying.

Mr. McCone insisted that to his knowledge the CIA was involved in no domestic spying during his term as director from 1961 to 1965.

Recent charges that the CIA had been guilty of overstepping its mandate by becoming involved in domestic surveillance already are under investigation in House and Senate subcommittees.

Senator Stennis had indicated his concern that a sweeping bipartisan inquiry, which might involve open, televised hearings, could severely damage the successful operation of the intelligence agency.

However, Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), Senate majority leader, who with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., (R., Md.), co-sponsored an earlier proposal for a CIA investigating panel, stressed that the aim of such a committee would be to carry out a "sober, not sensational" inquiry.

"We seek to cleanse, not to destroy," said Senator John O. Pastore (D., R.I.), adding that the proposed committee should be composed of eight senators who "had no ax to grind."

According to Senator Pastore, there should be no "polarization" of viewpoint among the senators on the CIA panel.

Using such a criterion, men such as Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.), an outspoken critic of defense and intelligence policies, would appear to be as unacceptable a choice as Senator Stennis or Senator John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), chairman of a Senate appropriations subcommittee that oversees the CIA budget.

It seemed to be the feeling among congressional observers that the move to examine and assess intelligence gathering agencies represented the "fresh wind" now said to be sweeping through Capitol Hill. There were predictions that the membership of the CIA panel would reflect the same housecleaning zeal Congress displayed in the wake of the Watergate scandals.

Senator Stennis indicated that he would fight against establishment of the select committee when the proposal reaches the Senate floor later this week. But informed sources said the Mississippi Democrat is more likely to seek to maneuver members of his liking onto the committee than to risk an even more resounding rebuff in the Senate.

There were reports that Senator Mathias is a potential chairman of the committee. Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) and Senator William Hart (D., Mich.) were also

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rumored as candidates to head the bipartisan panel.

Moreover, it was suggested that freshmen senators are likely to obtain a place on the committee, with such names mentioned as Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo.) and Senator John H. Glenn (D., Ohio). It was noted that both these men are members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and their inclusion might be offered as a sop to Mr. Stennis.

As Senator Pastore put it, "fresh faces and new ideas" are needed.

As outlined in the Senate resolution creating the CIA committee, the panel will have a \$750,000 budget, subpoena power and a mandate extending through September 1. The selection of from 7 to 11 members will be made by Senator Mansfield and Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.), Senate minority leader.

The Mathias plan proposed that the committee be composed of members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Armed Services Committee, Judiciary Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission. Its activities would not preclude independent investigations by congressional committees with oversight jurisdiction over the CIA.

Congressional sources stressed that there would be an effort to avoid the sensational in the probe, like the leaked revelations of the Senate Watergate committee. Because of the classified nature of intelligence-gathering operations, a perhaps substantial portion of the CIA hearings would be in private.

Open hearings, even with such witnesses as Mr. Helms, might be heavily weighted with bureaucratic discussion, a spokesman for a Republican senator said.

Senator Pastore said in a telephone interview, "This would be an in-depth hearing to ascertain whether there has been abuse and what can be done to remedy it. It is not going to be a focus of the television cameras, like Watergate."

The CIA committee would

have no legislative authority but would be responsible for outlining recommendations that could lead to stricter congressional oversight of intelligence operations, especially in the light of recent indications that the CIA had been the target of White House pressure.

The committee's inquiries would extend to the information gathering activities of the FBI which yesterday admitted that its files contained information on the personal lives of congressmen. Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (D., Wis.) promptly accused the FBI of "a cover-up as insidious as Watergate."

Also on the House side of Capitol Hill, there was a move yesterday to reduce possible bias on the part of congressmen assigned to consider intelligence appropriations.

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# DEMOCRATS VOTE WIDE C.I.A. STUDY BY SENATE PANEL

Party Caucus, 45-7, Urges  
Bipartisan Unit Like One  
in Watergate Hearings

## A SETBACK FOR STENNIS

Rockefeller Finds No Data  
to Indicate Massive and  
Illegal Domestic Spying

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20—The Senate Democratic Caucus voted 45 to 7 today to set up a bipartisan select committee, similar to the one established after the Watergate break-in, to investigate all aspects of foreign and domestic operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and other Government intelligence units.

A favorable vote had been expected, but the overwhelming majority in favor of the new committee was viewed as a major setback for Senator John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose traditional dominance of military matters in the Senate had gone unchallenged until this morning's caucus meeting.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, which he heads, had already begun hearings into allegations of domestic spying by the C.I.A.

"What happened today was a kind of revolution," said Senator Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, who emerged as a key spokesman during a recent debate on the Senate's oversight of intelligence matters.

### A Nine-Month Task

The Senate's Democrats specifically approved a resolution providing for the Senate leadership to name seven to 11 members to serve on the select, or special, committee, which will initially have a \$750,000 budget and nine months in which to complete its work.

In a related development, President Ford's "blue-ribbon" commission, headed by former C.I.A.'s domestic activities heard its second day of testimony today and afterward its chairman, Vice President Rockefeller, said "the impression left so far" was that the C.I.A. had not conducted a massive and illegal domestic spying operation.

A number of Senators said after the three-hour Democratic Caucus that no restrictions had been placed on the make-up of the panel, although there had been general agreement that those chosen should have no biases in any direction on national security.

It was this issue that directly led to Senator Stennis's rebuff. He did not challenge the apparent desire of the Democratic Caucus to approve the select committee, Senate sources said, but instead argued that the committee should be composed of Senators now serving on the Armed Services, Appropriations or Foreign Relations Committees.

Mr. Stennis was reported to have made an impassioned plea to prevent what he said would be the destruction of the C.I.A. stemming from an inquiry into alleged domestic spying. At times, his booming voice could be heard by newsmen waiting outside the caucus room.

But Senator Stennis received only a handful of votes, from some of the Democrats who serve on his Armed Services Committee and other conservative Southerners. The Mississippi Democrat hinted later to newsmen that he might oppose the special committee when it comes to the Senate floor for passage later this week.

Committee members will not be named until after that vote, Senate sources said.

Today's caucus result left many Senators and senior aides talking about "the end of an era."

"This is really the first time that John Stennis has gone to the mat and gotten decisively trounced," one caucus eyewitness said. He added that Mr. Stennis's defeat could have implications for the Senate on other matters normally dominated by Southern conservatives, such as the Pentagon's annual budget.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ford's "blue-ribbon" investigating commission headed by today from John A. McCone, who was director of Central Intelligence from 1961 to 1965, and J. Patrick Coyne, former executive secretary of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

A third witness was Richard Helms, the former C.I.A. director, who is now Ambassador to Iran. Mr. Helms, who testified for the second time before the eight-member commission, later told newsmen that former Presidents Johnson and Nixon had both expressed concern to him about possible foreign connections with the antiwar movement.

President Johnson discussed the matter with him in 1967, Mr. Helms said, and Mr. Nixon brought up the same issue after his election. "It was something he [Mr. Nixon] expressed to me in person," Mr. Helms told newsmen. "I don't know if there was any written direction."

### Helms Statement Recalled

In a statement made public last week, Mr. Helms suggested that the C.I.A. began its domestic operations in the late nineteen-sixties in response to Presidential requests.

After testifying in secret for more than two hours, Mr. McCone told newsmen that he knew of no domestic C.I.A. spying activities when he headed the agency.

In a 45-page statement released last week, William E. Colby, the present Director of Central Intelligence, told of two domestic wiretaps undertaken by the agency in 1963. But those two wiretaps, Mr. Colby added, were authorized in advance by Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General.

Mr. Coyne, who began his intelligence work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1941 in the late nineteen-forties, was said by an aide to Vice President Rockefeller, chairman of the Ford Commission to have testified to provide background on the various intelligence agencies and functions.

"He just knows about it," the aide said. "He's been in the business a long time."

"We got a broad picture," the Vice President was quoted by The Associated Press as saying, "and now we want to start working on details."

Senate sources said after today's Democratic Caucus that key arguments in favor of a wide-ranging select committee had been made by Senators Church, John O. Pastore of Rhode Island, Stuart Symington of Missouri, Walter Huddleston of Kentucky and Alan Cranston of California.

One Senator termed Mr. Cranston's speech a particular C.I.A. for its alleged domestic activities.

## A Broad Spectrum

Senator Pastore, who sponsored the bipartisan intelligence panel, told newsmen that he wanted "a broad spectrum of membership that isn't polarized or sympathetic — one extreme or the other. What I want is something new, something fresh."

The Rhode Island Democrat also took issue with Mr. Stennis's argument that the special inquiry would jeopardize the C.I.A.'s ability to conduct its intelligent-gathering operations. "The same argument [was] made with respect to Watergate," Mr. Pastore said, "that an investigation would destroy our Government. But it didn't. It reinforced our form of Government."

Senator Church said in a telephone interview that the caucus action "doesn't mean that the Senate is about to shuck the C.I.A. or any other intelligence operation."

"We're talking about a thorough investigation of the entire intelligence community as it works inside and outside the United States," he said. "This has never been undertaken before, and it couldn't have been but for a tidal shift in attitude toward those activities."

Along with the C.I.A. and its activities, the special committee will investigate the operations of the F.B.I.

The caucus also voted to give the committee responsibility to look into the following:

① The coordination—or lack of it—among intelligence agencies.

② The extent to which intelligence units are governed by secret orders from the executive branch.

③ Any violation or suspected violation of Federal laws by any intelligence agency, including illegal wiretapping and the surreptitious monitoring of mail.

④ The details surrounding the development of the 1970 White House plan to involve all intelligence agencies in increased activities against antiwar groups and other dissidents.

The plan was known as the Huston plan after its author, Tom Charles Huston, a former White House aide.

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## As We See It

[Editorial]

□ The Central Intelligence Agency, which obviously cannot function efficiently in the glare of a spotlight, has been very much in the news in recent months. We call your attention to the article by John A. McCone, former Director of the CIA, in this issue. The article explains, as the news reports have not, why we have a CIA and how vital it is to our national security. There were, evidently, clear examples of wrongdoing by some members of the Agency in recent years, excesses which went beyond the authority granted the CIA by Congress. These excesses were uncovered by a Senate committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) which, despite pleas from the White House, decided to expose the secret intelligence to the Nation and the world. The purpose of Congressional hearings is to develop information that will prompt legislation. Certainly legislation to prevent future excesses by the CIA might have been drafted and passed by Congress without publicizing our secrets, exposing America to ridicule and discrediting our intelligence organization.

□ This is an election year. Senator Church is ambitious. His insistence that the American people deserve to know all the facts is an effective one—editorially. But this is an extremely sensitive and critical area. The public should know how our Government operates, but must we know everything about everything? Can we maintain relations with other nations under such circumstances? Can American intelligence agencies collect information vital to our security when foreign informants are led to doubt our ability to protect our sources? A hundred KGB agents working overtime for the Kremlin could hardly have undermined the CIA as effectively as Senator Church's committee did. It was a shocking and immeasurably harmful blow to our national security.

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# WHY WE NEED THE CIA

A former Director of the agency puts television coverage of its activities into historical perspective

By John A. McCone

*The Central Intelligence Agency has been much in the news lately, as television news has covered Congressional investigations of the agency's activities. To add to viewers' understanding of that coverage, we present this article by John A. McCone, who was Director of the CIA during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 1961-65. Before that, he was one of the architects of the Department of Defense, and served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under James Forrestal.*

Any government, including even those which have the most elementary international association, must collect foreign intelligence. This pursuit of a special kind of information—and its refined product, which is knowledge—is an indispensable conclusion. Vigorous nations depend on their leaders to devise a strategy that will provide both for their security and for their economic and political well-being. History teaches us that leaders cannot meet this responsibility unless they learn the political, economic and military capabilities and intentions of other nations.

Today, great nations are armed as never before. And the leaders of great states must take heed of the risk involved. Furthermore, in their economic life, nations both large and small are interdependent, one with the other—more now than ever before in the past.

On the military side, the maneuvering of possible hostile forces, the deployment of mass-destruction weapons—and what could be of greater importance?—the hidden development of even more advanced weaponry, must all be discovered in good time and their possible effects measured. On the economic side, the task of intelligence services that provide information to safeguard the well-being of the state has lately been vastly amplified: a censorship has appeared that seeks to get economic advantage by imposing quotas and exorbitant prices on raw materials that heretofore have been in relatively free international flow.

Walter Lippmann once wrote, "Foreign policy is the shield of the Republic," and Sherman Kent, the distinguished historian, has said, "Strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the shield to the proper place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword."

What these men are saying is merely that sound decisions designed to protect the security interests, and the economic and political welfare of our country can only be made against a background of knowledge. Without the knowledge gained from foreign-intelligence gathering methods, and the appraisal of the significance of that knowledge developed through careful and studied analysis of the information, leaders can make no policy decisions with reasonable assurance that the action they plan is a correct one.

All vigorous nations, large and small, support a foreign-intelligence apparatus. Invariably, the organization is clandestine. Even in open societies, practical considerations demand that the organization be kept out of public view and its work made known only to the few who need to know. Usually, the authority granted to this organization and the

control over it are both embedded at the topmost echelon of power. When you make such decisions, you are aware of the intimate details of a foreign-intelligence service, you paralyze an otherwise effective operation.

It is no surprise that the so-called superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—both maintain elaborate intelligence systems; but the intelligence efforts of other countries throughout the world, some 40 in all, are also significant. Among them all, the intelligence service of the United States is the one that has the most comprehensive system. It was initiated and authorized legislatively—in our case, by Congressional action after long and thoughtful consideration by both houses of the Congress and with its operations and budgets reviewed by Congressional committees.

We got into the foreign intelligence business fairly recently. Between the two World Wars, the United States maintained little in the way of an intelligence community. To be sure, the Army and the Navy maintained separate intelligence units of their own, specifically to meet their needs in times of war. The Department of State kept a watchful eye on world happenings, and ambassadors regularly reported their observations. But, we had no organization in existence to analyze the whole flow of information and to study the dangers to American security inherent in the pattern of action reported from abroad. Thus, an inquiry into our surprise at Pearl Harbor, conducted after World War II, disclosed that our various government agencies had in hand—days prior to the actual attack—all essential information concerning Japan's preparations for war, including the assembly and departure of the Japanese fleet. The State, War and Navy Departments had each gathered the information, and each had used it for its own special interests, but—disastrously—no branch of government then had the duty to put the information together and alert the President of impending danger.

It was to correct this gaping deficiency in our government machinery that the Central Intelligence Agency was created under the National Security Act of 1947. To ensure that it would remain apart from partisan attachments and parochial interests, the CIA was developed essentially as a civilian organization.

It was then recognized that many departments of government must, in the interests of their departmental responsibilities and to broaden the base of all intelligence appraisals, continue their own intelligence efforts. I am speaking of the intelligence division of the State Department known as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research—a thoughtful organization that assesses information for the State Department; the Defense Intelligence Agency that supports the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; coordinates the work of the three separate foreign intelligence units and manages the corps of military attaches; the intelligence units of the Army, Navy and Air Force maintained to serve their Chiefs of Service and to provide current technical intelligence information to field commanders;

the intelligence units of the Treasury Department, and the Energy Research and Development Agency (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission), both of which contribute important specialized information on foreign developments; and finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which, in the course of its extensive domestic operations, is constantly unearthing information either originating abroad or having a significant foreign connection.

At the apex of this large, complex community is the Central Intelligence Agency. Its Director, as the President's principal intelligence officer, is charged by Presidential directive with the responsibility for the general direction of the community as a whole. This function he carries out in his individual role and as chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, which is the senior body of the community, and is composed of the directors of several departmental intelligence organizations.

The Central Intelligence Agency's responsibilities, as established by law, range from the collection of overt and covert intelligence by its own considerable establishment to the correlation and assessment of intelligence findings from all sources. In addition, the CIA is charged with protecting intelligence sources and methods and with executing tasks assigned to the President or the National Security Council. Under this latter mandate fall such essential activities as counterintelligence, which means ferreting out, together with the FBI, the covert activities of others. Also, the mandate covers covert political action and covert paramilitary operations—such as supporting or training and equipping of third-country nationals who espouse our principles of freedom and who are under attack by Communist forces directed from the center of Communist power.

Unevaluated intelligence—raw, as it is known in the trade—comes in many ways. Through the long sweep of history, human contact, both open and covert, has been the major source of intelligence. Conversations between heads of state, reports from ambassadors and military attaches, and articles in newspapers and other publications all contribute to the inventory of information. But the richest source is usually the secret agent, a well-trained professional, concealed under disarming cover, who usually moves in the highest and most informed circles.

The ethics of clandestine intelligence operations have long been debated and some would do away with them. The fact is that no international covenant has ever been agreed upon. For centuries, at least 40 nations today support clandestine services—no great state can abandon them.

In the recent past, technology has enormously lengthened the reach and sharpened the penetration of intelligence. High-flying aircraft carrying sophisticated cameras, supplemented by orbital satellites equipped with even more advanced cameras, have been able to look down into fortress societies and record in startling detail what is actually developing.

A correspondingly wide range of electronic sensing tracking devices makes it quite possible to accurately deduce the yield of nuclear devices, exploded either in the atmosphere or underground, at great distances; and to supply information on the characteristics and performance of military equipment that is being developed and tested beyond otherwise impenetrable frontiers. Indeed, in the event of a surprise attack, we would get our first warning of the blow being prepared from these intelligence-gathering systems.

Gathering the information is only the start of the intelligence process. The raw material, once obtained, must be drawn together, analyzed and correlated. And it must be evaluated before it becomes useful knowledge. An estimate of the developing situation emerges, and from this estimate a head of state, consulting with his advisers, can chart a course of action that will best meet the developing situation. Without the intelligence itself and the sophisticated estimate, the head of a government would be groping toward a decision.

All raw intelligence entering the community flows in one form or another to the CIA. From this processing comes a digest of what it all means and an estimate of what its consequences could be. The bits and pieces of information from near and far are studied by men and women of the highest capabilities: political scientists, economists, historians, linguists, engineers, physicists and other experts.

Daily intelligence reports are sent to the President and his principal advisers. Finally, there appears a body of papers known as the National Intelligence Estimates, presenting a continuing analysis of military, political and economic situations that bear directly on our national security and well-being. All are the product of the analytical process and are prepared within the halls of the Central Intelligence Agency, with a substantial oversight by the United States Intelligence Board.

Preparing this body of literature in its various forms is, in my opinion, the most important activity of the agency. It is certainly the least publicized.

In the discharge of its duties, the United States Intelligence Board gathers weekly at CIA headquarters—and often more frequently—to review the national estimates prepared by the CIA analysts. This review is made before the estimates are passed to the President and to others by the Director. It is also within the Board's purview to advise the Director on how best to supply the intelligence needs of the Nation's policymakers, schedule the flights of the reconnaissance satellites and photographic planes, fix the tasks of the National Security Agency, advise the precautions that may be desirable for protecting the Nation's intelligence sources and methods, and maintaining a watch office to be constantly on the alert for surprise hostile developments.

In the tempest—abundantly reported by television and the press—that has been whirling over the heads of the intelligence community and particularly the CIA in recent months, the accusation is frequently sounded that our intelligence community is an unsupervised, free-wheeling body—a law unto itself. This simply is not true. The President, himself, exercises control in a number of ways: through personal contact with his Director; through the Office of Budget and Management and a subcommittee of the National Security Council that oversees covert activities; and also through a civilian advisory board that meets frequently, reviews the community's operations and reports to the President. The House of Representatives and the Senate have special committees to oversee the community's activities and to review its budgets.

For all of this extensive oversight, recent accusations of wrongdoing—some imagined, others greatly overstated, but still a few justified—have set up a clamor for closer supervision of the intelligence operations and especially the clandestine activities.

In my opinion, the noise has been so great and the image of CIA has become so tarnished that changes must be made to extinguish, as much as possible, criticism, to restore confidence and to provide an on-going dynamic foreign intelligence service. But no changes will be useful unless the Congress, the press and electronic media, and the public can feel assured that the Nation's entire intelligence service, in playing its part to ensure the well-being of our Nation, will always confine its operations to acceptable moral and legal standards.

The remedies involve both legislative and executive action. As we seek change, we must take great care not to damage the effectiveness of the intelligence organization and we must accept the practical truth that a foreign intelligence operation, to be effective at all, must by its very nature remain "in privacy"—its activities must be cloaked in secrecy. In a free society we find it difficult to accept this concept, but society must accept the "cloak."

The proximity of the Central Intelligence Agency and its Director to the President and the National Security Council should be made more conspicuous. Indeed, it might be advisable to identify the organization as an arm of the National Security Council and identify it that way by name. Its Director would then be the Nation's principal intelligence officer, with statutory authority over all of the activities now conducted by the CIA and with general supervision over the community as a whole. A subcommittee of NSC with high-level representation from State, Defense, Treasury and the White House itself, could provide a watchful eye over all intelligence activities, not merely certain covert operations as now is the case. The President's Civilian Advisory Board should continue to provide him with an informed viewpoint outside of the channels of government.

To strengthen Congressional oversight, I suggest we create a single joint committee on intelligence, with membership drawn from both houses and adequately staffed. Such a committee should function in the same manner as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has functioned for almost 30 years. The confidentiality of all that is provided to this committee that I propose must remain within the committee, as has been the case through the years with our nuclear affairs. In particular, oversight by such a joint committee must be accepted as oversight by the Congress as a whole.

In one way or another, risks of leaks and disclosures of sensitive operations must be lessened or eliminated under severe penalties, authorized by law.

Beyond this, anyone who has been seriously connected with the responsibilities of national security will hope that our prolonged and painful review of the roles and missions of the CIA, and the work of the intelligence community as a whole, will end up by preserving an organization that can serve our security needs and yet rest comfortably within American political philosophy. Our Nation would hardly be safe without such an establishment.

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**Other Units Called 'Patsies'****New House Panel on CIA Is Sought**

By Mary Russell

Washington Post Staff Writer

House Democrats dissatisfied with congressional oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency will seek to create a new House Select Committee on Intelligence when the 291 House Democrats caucus Monday and Tuesday.

Rep. Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), author of the select committee proposal, said, "Every time I read that major, independent congressional committees are going to undertake investigations at the current allegations of illegal domestic surveillance by the CIA, I want to laugh. The day-to-day record of those committees is replete with indications that they didn't know or didn't want to know what's going on."

Harrington charged that, in fact, the committees had been "willing patsies" for the CIA, providing a "fictional cover" of congressional approval.

In a letter to Democratic Caucus Chairman Phillip Burton (D-Calif.), Harrington charged that last year the House Armed Services sub-

committee on intelligence, headed by Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), "devoted more time in hearings concerned with the unauthorized disclosure of classified information than with widespread accusations of improper agency actions."

He said his proposed select committee would look into not only the current allegations of domestic surveillance but "all facets of both CIA operations and congressional oversight."

"Left in the hands of the new presidential commission and the existing oversight committees, the CIA can be expected to weather the current controversy with little change in its policy and operations," Harrington said.

A Senate Armed Services subcommittee headed by John C. Stennis (D-Miss) has jurisdiction over the CIA on the Senate side, while the House Foreign Affairs Committee shares some jurisdiction on the House side.

Nedzi has already announced plans to investigate the current charges that the CIA spied on Americans in the United States and said

yesterday that formation of a new panel would just "duplicate efforts" of his committee. He said last year's committee reorganizations were intended "to streamline committees and not proliferate them."

"Rep. Harrington's free to charge whatever he desires, but in the final analysis the record will disclose we have done an extremely diligent and effective job since we have been delegated the responsibility for the CIA, Nedzi declared.

Nedzi said his subcommittee wasn't established until late in 1971 and "didn't get organized until 1972." By that time, he said, allegations of CIA participation in Watergate and other domestic activities had "all been known already."

Of the current allegations, Nedzi said: "While we have had some information on domestic operations, it did not correspond to the implications recently printed in the press and that's why we intend to hold hearings."

Harrington called his proposal's chances in caucus "probably pretty good." After that would come a floor vote by the full House.

Harrington said formation of a special congressional CIA committee—"an independent investigatory mechanism"—has already been endorsed by former CIA director John McCone and Clark Clifford, former chairman of President Kennedy's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Meanwhile, Sen. Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) said he will reintroduce legislation to create a Senate-House oversight committee with "broad powers to police the U.S. intelligence community." A Senate Government Operations subcommittee held two days of hearings last year on the proposal, which Weicker said had "the support of over one-third of the Senate."

One function of the proposed joint committee would be to authorize the funding for the CIA and the National Security Agency, so that their budgets could not be concealed in defense appropriations bills, Weicker said.

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